Ballistic missile attacks can come in many forms. One might prefer to think of war in the modern age as “unthinkable,” but it would be irresponsible to dismiss the harm enemies may wish us. With both textual descriptions and animations, “scenarios” shows what both attacks and interceptions would look like.
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"I often remind people that a ballistic missile attack using a weapon of mass destruction from a rogue state is every bit as much a threat to our borders now as a Warsaw Pact tank was two decades ago."
--- Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, December 8, 1998
Today the White House will announce that the North Koreans had been working at a Syrian nuclear reactor until it was destroyed last September in an Israeli airstrike, reports the New York Times. This discovery, based on video evidence, comes after a seven-month clandestine investigation. U.S. and Israeli senior officials believe that the strike targeted a fledgling nuclear reactor modeled after the North Korean reactor used for attaining fuel for its weapons system.
The site was destroyed by Israeli jets on September 6. After protesting, the Syrians bulldozed the site and erected a building on the area formerly holding the reactor. They have routinely denied access to international nuclear weapons inspectors.
The State Department finds the White House’s timing in declassifying this information suspicious. Some have suggested that the administration’s declassification is aimed at undermining a deal with the North Koreans that would allow it to be removed from the list of nations sponsoring terrorism.
One senior White House official has said, off the record that, “Making public the pictures is likely to inflame the North Koreans. And that’s just what opponents of this whole arrangement want, because they think the North Koreans will stalk off.” Another official claims that perhaps this new information will force North Korea to more fully divulge its projects in Syria with the disclosure of details pertaining to its nuclear activities.
The deal in question is being brokered by the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Christopher R. Hill, who is acting as the primary liaison with North Korea, and has suddenly become the latest point of contention in a seven-year battle within the Bush Administration over foreign policy as it relates to North Korea. That policy has evolved from attempting to pressure North Korea in hopes of collapsing Kim Jong-il’s government, to negotiating with North Korea along with Russia, China, South Korea and Japan—each of whom has pursued a unique strategy in solving the problem of North Korea.
Christopher Hill was charged with the task of determining a new strategy for dealing with the North Koreans more than three years ago. With dwindling support, Hill has struggled, and senior officials have reported that President Bush has overtly admonished his aides against pursuing any policy that “makes [him] look weak.” Vice President Cheney’s office has argued that Hill’s proposal would be too big a concession—in exchange for a perfunctory declaration form the North Koreans regarding its plutonium production, it would be removed from the list of nations sponsoring terrorism and therefore no longer subject to economic sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act. Still, the North Koreans have failed to volunteer information pertaining to its involvement with Syria and its plans to begin building arms using uranium. Hill’s deal would allow the North Koreans to continue on in relative secrecy. It would allow them to leave unexplained its purchase of uranium enrichment materials from Pakistan—materials and equipment that experts believe was obtained to help North Korea engineer another road to a nuclear bomb if it were forced to abandon its plutonium program.
Today American intelligence officials will, in a presentation to members of Congress, show videos of Koreans working among employees at a Syrian plant. Mr. Hill has already shown this footage to senior South Korean officials. Other pictures illustrate what seems to be the construction of a reactor vessel inside the very building later destroyed in the Israeli strike of September.
Officials have heretofore refused to speak about the September attack. Christopher Hill has found little support among his colleagues, including his boss, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who has sharply criticized the 1994 agreement between North Korea and the Clinton Administration for its “front loaded” rewards system for the North. Critics are saying something very similar of Mr. Hill’s proposed deal.
» More stories on: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Israel, Syria
Air Force Lt. Gen. General Obering said on Wednesday that the U.S. should be comfortable in welcoming a global missile defense race. Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency, has told Senate appropriators that in the absence of such defenses, a race for offensive missiles has already exploding all over the world due to easy access to certain kinds of offensive systems.
According to Obering, the kind of layered defense the U.S. is pursuing through the Bush Administration and allies would likely deter enemies and potential enemies from building arsenals of offensive missiles.
In a hearing on the MDA’s 2009 budget request, Obering confidently told appropriators that if Washington, its NATO allies and countries like Russia could come together to develop and field missile shields around the world, hostile regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang will certainly “think twice about [fielding] offensive missiles,” as history has shown that these sorts of defensive systems are “hard to defeat.”
Obering’s report comes as Pentagon and administration officials are in talks with European allies and Warsaw attempting to come to agreement over a proposal to install roughly one dozen missile interceptors in Poland. Additionally, the U.S. has already reached a preliminary agreement with the Czech Republic to put an advanced radar suite there.
Negotiations with Polish officials halted earlier in the year when a new government took over in Warsaw and made clear that its desire for greater American military and security support before agreeing to host interceptors. More recently, U.S. officials have been optimistic about the prospects of linking a deal with Poland.
Obering told the Senate appropriators that he is hopeful that an accord can be reached “by the end of the year,” which would allow the MDA to begin the competition for the European shield work. The agency hopes to select a contractor soon enough to start work in Europe by the end of next year.
Meanwhile, Obering has reported that the Airborne Laser (ABL) effort, geared towards installing a laser weapon on board a Boeing 747 jet, is scheduled for a missile shoot-down test in mid-2009. Following this test, Obering said, agency officials will apply lessons provided by the test, during a “transition period” during which the agency will “try to figure out how to make the third and fourth planes as affordable as possible.”
With the ABL program progressing, Army Lt. Gen Kevin Campbell, chief of the Army Space and Missile Defense and Army Strategic Forces commands argues that the ground force is in talks with Air Force officials about the latter’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) program. These two bodies are working to integrate certain AHW technologies with the Air Force’s Prompt Global Strike program aimed at fielding a next-generation weapon capable of striking fleeting targets around the glove faster than today’s munitions. Additionally, MDA is working on doubling the size of its forthcoming SM-3 missile fleet over the next five years.
The Pentagon’s recently completed Joint Capability Mix II Study was meant to study the cocktail of missile defense weapons and sensors to handle threats that may occur in the 2015 time frame. The examination concluded that more SM-3 missiles would be needed. General Campbell has said that MDA plans to scatter the doubled SM-3 fleet across the “out years” of the future years defense strategy.
» More stories on: NATO, Testing - American
» Missile system details for: Airborne Laser (ABL)
A layer of space-based interceptors would enable a global on-call missile defense capability that could produce a timely response to rapidly evolving situations and would enable the U.S. to be prepared for all types of threats that could develop out of unpredictable locations.
In his remarks, Allard explained that this kind of layered missile defense is more appropriate in the post-Cold War era during which small terrorist groups and rogue nations are able to launch missiles around the world. The implementation of such a program, Allard said, would provide an extra layer of defense rather than replace existing segments. "This makes more sense than going back into the 'assured mutual destruction' mentality of times gone by."
The current White House budget for a space test bed for missile defense for the Missile Defense Agency is set at $10 million. Allard warned that the incoming administration will need to campaign aggressively in order to keep the possibility of a space test bed alive.
The next administration will have to choose which direction to take and which way it wants to go: continue the trend demonstrated by the 110th Congress of prioritizing near-term projects at the expense of future projects, or invest in a comprehensive long-term goal such as space-based interceptors that would be able to reach targets more rapidly and are capable of destroying enemy missiles in the boost phase.
» More stories on: Space-Based Systems
It's in [Putin's] interests that we participate and share information. After all, a missile from the Middle East can fly north just as easily as it could fly west, and the capacity to be able to share information and share technology to be able to deal with these threats is important for a lot of countries, including Russia.
While optimistic, much work remains, according to Bush.
Obviously we've got work to do to convince [Putin] and the people around him that the missile defense system is not aimed at Russia, or is viewed as a anti-Russian device. Well, it's not, and, therefore, it requires a lot of time, a lot of discussion. That's what Condi Rice and Bob Gates spent time doing when they were in Russia, and that is to defuse any notions that this is aiming something at somebody in Europe. This is all aiming to protect people in Europe.
President Bush noted the difficulties of U.S.-Russian relations: "we're dealing with a lot history and a lot of suspicion...the President and I will try to work through these for our common good. And I'm hopeful we can have some breakthroughs."
Bush is scheduled to meet with Putin in Sochi this week. This will be the last face-to-face meeting between the two before Putin departs his office.
» More stories on: Policy, European Missile Defenses
» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD
» More stories on: Japan
» Missile system details for: Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
Lieutenant General Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, delivered the dedication speech at the unveiling of a new Reagan Monument at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Lompoc, California today. Vandenberg, home to three interceptors residing in underground silos, seemed the perfect place to remember Reagan's own words on missile defense and to reinvigorate his SDI vision. Speakers included Representative Trent Franks (R-AZ) and Riki Ellison, founder and president of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.
» More stories on: Policy
» More stories on: Testing - Foreign, North Korea
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Strategic Defense Intitiative, Tom Karako, director of programs for the Claremont Institute, writes in Investor's Business Daily comparing current missile defense policies with those begun by Ronald Reagan. Excerpts:
...The Bush administration has taken important first steps toward national missile defense. It withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and has made tremendous progress in deploying missile defenses, two things Reagan did not do. Current programs deserve much praise, but nevertheless fall short of the threat-based defense SDI in important ways pursued by Reagan.
Reagan envisioned a defense that was strategic, oriented to stopping the most an enemy could threaten. SDI emphasized interceptors in low Earth orbit. Space-based interceptors formed the primary front line of a defense, intended to be supplemented by sea- and land-based interceptors.
By the early 1990s, SDI had advanced to the level of the major defense acquisition program, a constellation of small, space-based interceptors. The Brilliant Pebbles concept promised a cost-effective way to destroy missiles in their ascent or boost phase, when they are most visible and vulnerable.
As the Missile Defense Agency's historian has documented, the program was cut for political reasons just as it was nearing the deployment phase. Its technologies were, however, successfully space-tested by the Clementine and Astrid programs in 1994.
Some hesitation about space defenses comes from the idea that space is a weapons-free preserve. But the high ground of space is merely an extension of strategic geography, and has long been "weaponized."
Armies project power on land, navies on the high seas, aircraft in the atmosphere. Satellites and missiles do so above the atmosphere. Satellites that surveil the enemy or send GPS coordinates to a warfighter are no less weapons because they do not go "boom." If a satellite in orbit helps direct a laser-guided bomb to a target in Afghanistan, in exactly what sense is space not weaponized?
All ballistic missiles travel through space, and it makes sense to intercept them from and in space. Putting interceptors closer to the paths of these missiles shortens the distance they must travel and widens the window of reaction time.
Orbited interceptors are already accelerated to 8 kilometers per second, and do not require a massive booster rocket. Any surface-based system, by contrast, retains the physical challenge of needing to be accelerated at a moment's notice. In missile interception, seconds matter. Basing in space buys time.
Orbital basing also increases the ability to destroy missiles in their boost phase. Unless they are close to the launch site, ground-based interceptors cannot reach missiles in their boost phase if launched inland. Orbits know no political boundaries, so orbiting interceptors could reach missiles in boost phase even if launched deep inside Iran, Russia or China.
...One may defend the modesty of the current approach on the ground that it is imprudent to irritate our strategic competitors in a time of war. But let us have no confusion about the degree to which some missiles retain a free ride to the American homeland.
Let us admit we intend to remain vulnerable to even accidental and unauthorized missiles coming from Russia or China. The path of deliberate minimalism is deterred from boldly pursuing the most effective missile defense systems. Such self-deterrence did not characterize Reagan or SDI.
As Secretary of State Rice remarked in February, "It is true that the United States once had a Strategic Defense Initiative, a program that was intended to deal with the question of the Russian strategic nuclear threat. This is not that program. This is not the son of that program. This is not the grandson of that program."
This is true. Twenty five years later, the S has been dropped from SDI. ...
» More stories on: Analysis, Policy, Space-Based Systems
» Missile system details for: Thule Early Warning Radar
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