Polish Analyst: Russia May Send S-300 Missiles to Iran via Belarus
June 7, 2006 :: BBC Worldwide Monitoring :: Analysis
Russia may export S-300 air/missile defense interceptors to Iran via Belarus, writes Polish analyst Piotr Koscinski on the Rzeczpospolita newspaper website. Koscinski cites the Russian publication Vzglyad, which published an article in April 2006 suggesting that Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka himself would be the go-between for the transaction. The move would allow Russia to categorically deny the sale of these weapons to Iran, and maintain its image within the G-8 and on the world stage. According to Jane’s Intelligence Digest, an Iranian military delegation visited Minsk in January 2006, and negotiations surrounding the transfer of S-300 systems took place. According to Aleksandr Rakhimchyk, deputy director of the Moscow-based Institute of Military and Political Analysis, if Iran receives Russian-made S-300 systems, the U.S. would not be able to carry out a military operation against the Islamic Republic “without suffering significant losses.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Former Soviet Republics, Iran, Proliferation, Russia
» Missile system details for: S-300P (SA-10 Grumble), S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator, SA-12B Giant)
NYT on Conventionally Armed ICBMs
May 31, 2006 :: New York Times :: Analysis
Michael Gordon, writing in The New York Times, discusses the Pentagon’s plan to develop a non-nuclear version of the submarine-launched Trident II intercontinental ballistic missile that could be used to attack terrorist camps, enemy missile sites, suspected caches of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, and other urgent threats. The article features portions of an interview with General James Cartwright, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, who explained the reasoning behind the move toward a non-nuclear system:
In looking for a new weapon, Cartwright said, his goal was a non-nuclear system that could respond to a threat in no more than an hour, including the time that would be needed to secure the president’s authorization to attack. … Neither bombers nor cruise missiles met Cartwright’s requirement because he reasoned that the threat might emerge in a region where the United States lacked bases or had few or no forces. It can take days for the United States to move aircraft and ships into a crisis zone and position them to strike. Bombers can attack remote targets from the United States or bases abroad, but it takes many hours to conduct such a mission. So the Strategic Command developed a plan to fit conventional warheads on existing Trident II ballistic missiles. … The weapon would give the president an option to respond quickly to the sort of immediate dangers that are most likely to become more common in the 21st century without taking the drastic step of resorting to a nuclear-armed ballistic missile.
Cartwright also outlined a number of measures that could be taken to reduce the risk of miscalculation by another nuclear power. The U.S. could notify Russia and other nations of all launches. It could allow foreign nations to monitor tests of the system. “We are going to put a target area in the ocean so people can actually see what it looks like when it hits the earth and don’t confuse this with a mushroom cloud,” Cartwright said. He added that the U.S. could also launch the missiles from parts of the ocean that would not put them on a trajectory toward Russian territory. The U.S. could also establish an American-Russian center where early warning data could be shared. (Article, Link)
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Brown and Schlesinger on Need for Conventionally Armed ICBMs
May 22, 2006 :: Washington Post :: Analysis
Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, two former U.S. secretaries of defense, today published an op-ed in The Washington Post in support of deploying conventional warheads on U.S. ICBMs. The article begins with a detailed description of the very type of situation that would require such warheads.
Within the past hour, a terrorist organization, known to have acquired several nuclear weapons, has been observed by a U.S. imaging system loading the weapons onto vehicles and preparing to leave for an unknown destination. A delay of even an hour or two in launching a U.S. strike on that location could mean the group would depart, contact might be lost, and the weapons would be smuggled into the United States or an allied nation and detonated.
… If the terrorists were far from U.S. aircraft or cruise missiles, the only option available to the president would be to order the use of a ballistic missile—a land-based Minuteman or submarine-based Trident D5—either one of which could hit a target almost anywhere on the globe within a half-hour. One big problem, though: At present, all of these missiles are equipped only with nuclear warheads.
Would the president order a preventive nuclear strike in such circumstances? It’s conceivable, but very unlikely. There would still be doubts as to whether the intelligence was accurate, and even if it was, the consequences of an unprecedented action of this kind might well be regarded as unacceptable—in terms of the risk to innocent lives, of environmental damage and of the expected political repercussions around the world.
Brown and Schlesinger argue that the increasing likelihood of “scenarios requiring prompt, precise, non-nuclear strikes” justifies the Pentagon’s move to replace the nuclear warheads on two of the Trident D5 missiles on every strategic submarine with new highly accurate, conventional warheads. They note, however, that the proposal has been met with strong opposition, both domestically and internationally.
Some have argued that it is unwise to substitute conventional warheads for nuclear ones on strategic submarines even if it’s only on two missiles per submarine. They fear it could be the beginning of a wholesale attempt to replace nuclear capabilities with conventional weapons. Given that submarine-based warheads constitute roughly two-thirds of the U.S. deterrent, and are the component best able to survive, these capabilities should not be compromised, they maintain. But the concept does not require a reduction in submarine-based warheads. Additional nuclear warheads would be added to the remaining nuclear-armed missiles on each submarine to keep the number constant.
Others assert that mistakes could be made in the action messages conveyed to the submarines or that, for some other reason, the granting of a dual mission to strategic submarines could compromise the strict controls that ensure that nuclear missiles are not launched inadvertently. But the Navy has worked out both procedural and physical measures that will avoid any such problems, and it has high credibility in this regard. For decades during the Cold War the Navy maintained both conventional and nuclear versions of air defense missiles, cruise missiles, torpedoes and bombs on its ships and submarines without serious incident.
Still others are concerned that the launch of even one long-range ballistic missile, nuclear-armed or not, could trigger an adverse reaction from Russia and even a counter-launch if Russian leaders feared that they themselves were under attack. Past experience indicates that detection of a single missile launch (especially from a submarine operating area), even if detected and unannounced, might raise a diplomatic issue, but it wouldn’t trigger a military response. In any case, Russian leaders could be notified and the reasons for the strike disclosed as the missile neared its target.
(Article, Link)
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» Missile details: Scud B variant
Thayer on a Summary of Missile Defense Programs
May 8, 2006 :: The Weekly Standard :: Analysis
“It’s not perfect, not yet, but we are closing in on a reliable defense to ballistic missile attack,” writes James Thayer in The Weekly Standard. While national attention is focused on the nuclear threat from Iran, MDA continues to develop and deploy systems that will knock out enemy warheads. The Pentagon is currently deploying ground-based midcourse interceptors in Alaska and California, Standard Missile-3 interceptors on Aegis-equipped warships, and a host of radars and sensors to detect and track incoming threats. It is also developing the Airborne Laser, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense, the Medium Extended Air Defense System, and other such systems. The end result is that the U.S. will soon have an integrated system of air, land, sea, and space-based missile defense assets. In addition, the Pentagon has secured critical BMD partners such as Japan, Australia, Great Britain, Israel, Germany, Italy, and possibly Canada, India, and Poland, ensuring that its initiatives have lasting international support.
Thayer notes, however, that domestic opposition to ballistic missile defense remains strong. The “scoffing” that began in the early 1980s, when Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, continues to this day unabated. MDA’s initiatives are routinely questioned, ridiculed, and condemned in the editorial pages of major U.S. newspapers and magazines. Self-proclaimed “watchdog” organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists frequently claim that there is “no basis for believing the system will have any capability to defend against real attack.” Even prominent individuals have jumped on the anti-BMD bandwagon, such as Eugene Habiger, former head of U.S. Strategic Command, who recently announced, “A system is being deployed that doesn’t have any credible capability.” If one were to pay attention to the rhetoric, it would appear as if missile defense is on its death bed.
Yet the evidence is clear that U.S. BMD is making progress, and is well on its way to becoming a reality. Soon, the U.S. will have a credible, reliable defense against ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads deployed by rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea, or even transnational terrorist organizations emanating from the Middle East and elsewhere. In the post-Cold War era, when such entities are not restrained by abstract, academic balance-of-power theories, such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), missile defense has become justifiable and inevitable. In response to those who oppose the creation of a national missile defense, Thayer writes, “Star Wars is here, now.” Assets are already in place; more will come, provided the political will is present. (Article, Link)
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BMD as Koizumi’s Heritage for Japan
May 4, 2006 :: UPI :: Analysis
Japan is now America’s “most important global ally in the development of global missile defense” largely due to the efforts of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, writes the UPI’s Martin Sieff. Koizumi is required to step down in September as leader of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party and as prime minister after five years in the top job, but “the ballistic missile defense alliance he has fashioned with the United States will live on after him.” No other U.S. ally can compare to the financial and industrial resources Japan now brings to BMD development. Japan is assisting in the development of the sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defense system; its industries are shortly expected to begin building Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles; and it has expressed its eagerness to explore airborne laser technologies. Sieff predicts that close cooperation between Japan and the U.S. will continue for many years, as the joint development programs offer a “potential bonanza” of access to cutting edge technology for Japan’s major industries. In addition, BMD has repeatedly proven popular with the Japanese public, so much that “post-Koizumi governments that might otherwise be tempted to cut back on them risk being punished in the voting booths if they do so.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Allies, Analysis, Japan
» Missile system details for: Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense
Hackett on Missile Defense Policy and Iran
April 28, 2006 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
Writing for The Washington Times, James T. Hackett offers a sobering assessment of the ballistic missile threat from Iran. The Islamic Republic is currently believed to have between 50 and 100 operational Shahab-3s. It produces one additional Shahab per month, with production reportedly increasing. Modifications could extend the missile’ range to 2,000 miles, which would reach Berlin. Iran may also be buying North Korea’s longer-range Taepodong-2. With a second stage on top, that missile could reach the U.S. East Coast. Hackett argues that diplomacy is the prudent course for now, but the U.S. should simultaneously improve its missile defenses. The Pentagon should help Israel upgrade its Arrow interceptors, deploy sea-based missile defense in the Persian Gulf, build the planned missile defense site in Europe, and develop of boost-phase defenses that can stop missile of any range or capability. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Iran
» Missile details: Shahab-6
Spring on Need for Congress to Advance “Limited” Funding
April 27, 2006 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis
Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation argues that U.S. missile defense is “very thin and needs to be strengthened.” The current, limited, defensive shield of eleven Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors in Alaska and California and less than ten Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors on Aegis warships are not enough to adequately defend against an attack from Iran or North Korea. Congress must make the following changes to its missile defense budget for FY 2007: (1) increase funding for the GMD system by $200 million to accelerate testing and deployment; (2) increase funding for the SM-3 by $100 million to support the deployment of 100 interceptors by 2011; (3) cut funding for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program by 50 percent; (4) reduce funding for miscellaneous BMD projects by $100 million and redirect the funds to near-term deployment; and (5) reallocate resources to new technologies previously banned by the ABM Treaty, such as space-based interceptors.
Congress, as it undertakes the task of drafting the fiscal year (FY) 2007 Defense Authorization bill, must recognize that this defense is very thin and needs to be strengthened. It can do so by making several significant changes in the missile defense budget, such as adding funds to accelerate the concurrent testing and operation program for the long-range missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California and to improve and expand the sea-based interceptors on the Navy’s AEGIS ships. Looking to the future, Congress should direct the Agency to start serious work on placing missile defense interceptors in space.
…The Bush Administration must finally break the missile defense program free from the enduring effects of the ABM Treaty. This means giving the missile defense interceptors already in the field and those soon to be fielded as much operational capability as possible. It also means moving missile defenses where they will be most effective, space. By adjusting missile defense funding for FY 2007 and making clear its intentions for future years, Congress can prod the Administration in this direction.
(Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Space-Based Systems
» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD, Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
Henderson on Saudi-China-Pakistan Missile Ties
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultan’s previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistan’s Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Pakistan, Proliferation
» Missile details: CSS-2
Payne on Lingering Allegiance to the Balance of Terror
April 19, 2006 :: Defense News :: Analysis
“Cold War era” political thinking is threatening to undermine recent progress that has been made in U.S. ballistic missile defense, argues Keith Payne in Defense News. From the early 1960s to the late 1970s, U.S. strategic thought was dominated by the concept of deterrence, a “balance of terror” that categorized strategic BMD as “unnecessary, useless, destabilizing, unaffordable, and an impediment to ending what was called the arms race.” Payne notes that this balance of terror “amazingly retains a powerful hold on thinking in many political and academic circles,” even though it is largely irrelevant to contemporary threats posed by Iran and North Korea. The continuing hold of this concept is unfortunate, he argues, because the shift in context from Cold War to post-Cold War has changed the “measures of merit” for missile defense. First, while effective BMD was considered “technically infeasible and practically unaffordable” again the Soviet Union, the much more limited post-Cold War threats have greatly eased these challenges. Second, while the “balance of terror” was considered predictable against the Soviet leadership and thus decreased the value of BMD, the enormous uncertainties attached to predicting the behavior of the Iranian and North Korean leadership increase the value of these defenses. Third, the Cold War logic that missile defense is destabilizing is incoherent against contemporary threats, as BMD systems cannot motivate nuclear enemies to strike first when the U.S. retains the ability to launch an annihilating second strike. (Article, Link)
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CSIS Report on Taiwan’s Vulnerability to Chinese Missiles
April 17, 2006 :: UPI :: Analysis
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a prominent Washington think tank, recently published a report highlighting Taiwan’s anti-ballistic missile vulnerabilities. The report, entitled “The Paths Ahead: Missile Defense in Asia,” was prepared by Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Clinton, and CSIS senior fellow Jeremiah Gertler. It argues that the cost of deploying missile defenses far exceeds China’s cost of producing large numbers of old-fashioned, lower-tech missiles which could swamp Taiwan’s defenses.
Campbell and Gertler predict that in the event of a Chinese attack, Taiwan’s interceptors would be outnumbered six or seven to one. In addition, new Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, and fast-attack boats are creating the capability to push U.S. Aegis-equipped warships out of missile defense range, leaving Taiwan entirely dependent on its ground based Patriot systems.
The report also paints a grim picture of a Taiwanese public, political elite, and military deeply divided over the subject of missile defense. It describes the issue as “unusually polarizing” within the public, adding that opposition political parties view missile defense as “a provocation to China” and an “obstacle to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” In addition, the report points out major divisions within the Taiwanese armed forces, with the Army opposed to missile defense, the Navy in favor, and the Air Force still divided. (Article, Link)
» CSIS Report: “The Paths Ahead: Missile Defense in Asia”
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Taiwan
