Dinerman on U.S.-Japan Defense Alliance and the Shifting Asian Balance of Power
April 11, 2006 :: The Space Review :: Analysis
Taylor Dinerman argues in TheSpaceReview.com that the U.S.-Japanese missile defense alliance is changing the balance of power against North Korea and to a lesser extent against China. Today, were the U.S. were to deploy a substantial number of Patriot-Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors along with several Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors, they would be able to shoot down half of North Korea’s 100 or so Nodong-1 and 2 missiles. A few years from now, when Japan deploys its PAC-3s and SM-3s, the missile threat from Pyongyang “will be reduced to insignificance.” Similarly, China’s ability to strike the U.S. homeland is diminishing as the U.S. continues to deploy its missile defenses. As the effectiveness of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) and the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) increases, the cost to China of maintaining its capability will increase as well. Dinerman adds that if the U.S. were to develop and deploy a space-based system similar to Brilliant Pebbles, China would lose “most of its nuclear options against the U.S. homeland and perhaps against Japan as well.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Japan, North Korea
Congressman Brownback on Need for Ballistic Missile Defense
April 8, 2006 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis
In a speech yesterday at the Heritage Foundation, Congressman Sam Brownback (R-KS) discussed the emerging threats from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations. In particular, he mentioned a point seldom discussed: the vulnerability of U.S. forces in Iraq and South Korea to ballistic missile attack. According to Brownback:
We forget that it was only in 1991 that our troops during the first Gulf war were actually killed by missiles. A single SCUD missile hit a U.S. military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 of our soldiers and wounding 99.
Today, our capacity to shoot down even a relatively crude SCUD missile is not much improved from that time. Our forces in Iraq and Korea—and the civilian populations they defend—have almost no means of protection against Iranian or North Korean ballistic missiles armed with both chemical and conventional warheads.
Brownback argued that the Pentagon should review and if necessary “step up” its ballistic missile defense programs in order to guarantee the safety of these troops. (Article, Link)
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Hackett on ABL Program Progress
April 6, 2006 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
MDA’s Airborne Laser (ABL) is making progress and will soon provide a boost-phase defense against emerging missile threats, writes James T. Hackett in The Washington Times. The ABL consists of a high-energy laser deployed on a Boeing-747 capable of flying to trouble spots around the world. Once operational, the system will be able to destroy enemy missiles right after their launch, before they can release warheads or decoys. The ABL will add a new boost-phase capability to the U.S. missile defense system, a first line of defense. With two ABLs on station, one could be airborne 24 hours a day, neutralizing threats from North Korea, Iran, elsewhere in the Middle East, or along the China coast.
Hackett notes that the ABL has met every milestone over the past two years. In 2004, the high-energy laser was fired for the first time. In 2005, it succeeded in generating lethal power. Next year, the laser will be tested in flight. The ABL will then be prepared for its first shoot-down, which will take place in 2008. Hackett remains optimistic about the program, but warns that Washington needs to remain focused on bringing the system to fruition. The recent escalation in the conflict with Iran, he argues, makes the ABL more urgent than ever. (Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Airborne Laser (ABL)
NYT on Iranian Satellite Launch
April 5, 2006 :: News
Iran’s recent satellite launch demonstrates that the Islamic Republic is attempting to master a new range of sophisticated technologies—satellites and rockets—which could be used to further its nuclear program. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger examine this issue in the New York Times, providing quotes from a broad range of military and space experts. The spacecraft, a microsatellite weighing a few hundred kilograms, was launched last October from Russia. Iran claims that its space program is aimed at improving telecommunications and monitoring natural disasters. However, Iran is currently developing its own delivery devices, the biggest of which “could hurl not only satellites into space but warheads between continents,” according to Broad and Sanger. Thus, while it might be tempting to dismiss Iran’s efforts as crude and benign, Iran’s space-based technologies could very well be used for strategic purposes. If Iran had the ability to monitor and guide its nuclear missiles to their targets, it would become a much more capable and deadly enemy. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Iran, Space-Based Systems
Bulava Said to Carry Six Warheads
April 4, 2006 :: Analysis
Russia’s Bulava (SS-NX-30) submarine-launched ballistic missile will carry six warheads, according to the January 2006 START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Pavel Podvig comments at RussianForces.org that the number of warheads “seems to be final.”
The MOU also mentions that the throw-weight of the missile will be 1,150 kg. Podvig, however, comments that this weight seems light in comparison with the latest generation Soviet SLBMs. By comparison, the SS-N-23 carrying four warheads weighed 2,800 kg, while the SS-N-20 carrying ten warheads weighed 2,550 kg. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Russia
» Missile details: SS-26
Hackett on Missile Defense 23 Years After Reagan’s SDI Speech
March 23, 2006 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
James T. Hackett summarizes the state of U.S. ballistic missile defense in The Washington Times, 23 years to the day after President Regan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative. Although the need to protect the nation against nuclear missiles has taken a back seat to the fight against Al-Qaeda and military operations in Iraq, the need for missile defense is as strong as ever. Iran, North Korea, and China all represent substantial threats, as well as terrorist organizations such as those operating inside Pakistan. Yet Hackett notes the U.S. is moving forward with its deployment and development projects, most notably the ground-based midcourse defense deployed in Alaska and California, as well as the Aegis sea-based defense. Moreover, he notes that BMD is on the rise worldwide: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Israel, Turkey, India, Kuwait and other Persian Gulf sheikdoms have or plan to obtain missile defenses. Thus, “the effort Ronald Reagan started is now beginning to defend the country.” (Article, Link)
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Andrew on Chinese Missile and Defensive Buildup
March 15, 2006 :: Analysis
Martin Andrew of the Jamestown Foundation argues that ballistic missile defense in Asia is reducing China’s strategic deterrence. As China deploys its theater-range missiles, other military powers in the region are investing in BMD systems, such as sea-based Aegis systems and ground-based THAAD systems. These new systems will be able to intercept Chinese missiles over Chinese airspace, thus putting China in what Andrew terms a “strategic quandary.” An excerpt:
BMD systems are being deployed in Northeast Asia because of the build-up in Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles. Yet if it were to negotiate the removal of its ballistic missiles facing Taiwan it loses its key leverage over Taiwan—with Japan and South Korea still keeping their BMD systems in the face of North Korea’s arsenal. Yet by sustaining—and adding to—missile forces in Fujian, Beijing runs the risk of negating its strategic deterrence. If the Chinese leadership follows its doctrine of active defense and believed its nuclear deterrence was becoming neutralized or under threat, it could conceivably launch strikes against Taiwan and Japanese and U.S. ballistic defense missile forces, certainly leading to retaliatory economic and military action. With the acceleration of Chinese ballistic missile forces opposite Taiwan, this is becoming a matter of concern on both sides of the Asia-Pacific.
(Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Foreign Affairs Article on the Future of Assured Destruction
February 27, 2006 :: Analysis
Foreign Affairs this month published a major article on the future of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) written by Keir A. Lieber, assistant professor at Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania. The article argues that with the U.S. arsenal growing rapidly while Russia’s decays and China’s stays small, the era of MAD is over and the era of U.S. nuclear primacy has begun. Along these lines, Lieber and Press assert that Washington’s pursuit of nuclear primacy helps explain its missile-defense strategy. An excerpt:
Critics of missile defense argue that a national missile shield, such as the prototype the United States has deployed in Alaska and California, would be easily overwhelmed by a cloud of warheads and decoys launched by Russia or China. They are right: even a multilayered system with land-, air-, sea-, and space-based elements, is highly unlikely to protect the United States from a major nuclear attack. But they are wrong to conclude that such a missile-defense system is therefore worthless—as are the supporters of missile defense who argue that, for similar reasons, such a system could be of concern only to rogue states and terrorists and not to other major nuclear powers.
… The sort of missile defenses that the United States might plausibly deploy would be valuable primarily in an offensive context, not a defensive one—as an adjunct to a U.S. first-strike capability, not as a standalone shield. If the United States launched a nuclear attack against Russia (or China), the targeted country would be left with a tiny surviving arsenal—if any at all. At that point, even a relatively modest or inefficient missile-defense system might well be enough to protect against any retaliatory strikes, because the devastated enemy would have so few warheads and decoys left.
During the Cold War, Washington relied on its nuclear arsenal not only to deter nuclear strikes by its enemies but also to deter the Warsaw Pact from exploiting its conventional military superiority to attack Western Europe. … Now that such a mission is obsolete and the United States is beginning to regain nuclear primacy, however, Washington’s continued refusal to eschew a first strike and the country’s development of a limited missile-defense capability take on a new, and possibly more menacing, look. The most logical conclusions to make are that a nuclear-war-fighting capability remains a key component of the United States’ military doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States.
(Article, Link)
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The Guardian Reports on British Participation in Subcritical Nevada Test
February 27, 2006 :: London Guardian :: Analysis
The Guardian reports that Britain recently took part in a subcritical test of nuclear material in Nevada. The “Krakatau test,” as it was called, took place on February 23 and involved a detonation 300 m beneath the desert. The test was designed to demonstrate that Britain’s nuclear bombs have not deteriorated while in storage and will still go off should they ever be launched. Such subcritical tests are normal, as plutonium can undergo phase changes which can alter its behavior as it ages. The Guardian, however, speculates that the U.S. and Britain might use such tests to help develop next generation nuclear warheads. The U.S. has discussed the possibility of developing “robust nuclear earth penetrators,” otherwise known as “bunker-busters,” which would be able to destroy structures deep underground. Although the Bush administration’s funding to modify two existing nuclear warheads for earth penetration was blocked by Congress in 2005 and 2006, funding was approved for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which The Guardian hypothesizes might be a cover for new warhead development. (Article, Link)
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Commentary on Russian Claims
February 15, 2006 :: RIA-Novosti :: Analysis
RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Kislyakov writes that the U.S. ballistic missile defense system will become operational within years, thus providing a “credible capability,” but adds that “Russia has missiles that don’t care.” He continues with a description of the anti-BMD capabilities of the road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile:
While the U.S. is stepping up its effort to deploy early warning radars and interceptors as close to Russia’s borders as possible to detect missile launches and kill missiles at the boost stage of flight when they are the most vulnerable—and as long as the body and the warhead are still in one piece—the Topol-M, powered by three solid-propellant boosters, accelerates faster than earlier ICBMs and is accordingly less vulnerable to that kind of attack. The missile also has scores of auxiliary jets and a state-of-the-art flight control system that enables a 3D avoidance maneuver capability from the first seconds of flight.
And on top of everything else—in every sense—is the nuclear re-entry vehicle, in fact a ramjet-boosted supersonic cruise missile whose additional sustainer engine accelerates it to between Mach 4 and Mach 5 (Mach is the speed equal to the speed of sound in the air).
Such maneuverability renders a missile system a crucial surprise advantage, as the adversary cannot launch a fire-and-forget interceptor weapon because no anticipated point of contact is known or can be reliably calculated. Normally, the Topol-M carries one warhead but, unlike other strategic ICBMs, it can be easily upgraded with an advanced warhead carrying up to three independently targetable re-entry vehicles. The warhead fires off the vehicles in midcourse, changing direction twice a minute to fool warning radars as to where the charges are heading. Each vehicle is assigned an individual target at up to 100km (60 miles) from the separation point.
(Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Maneuverable Warheads, Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6
