Poll: Oregon and Washington Voters Strongly Support Missile Defense
June 16, 2006 :: MDAA :: News
Overwhelming support for missile defense exists in Oregon and Washington states, according to recent polling conducted between June 1 and 4 by AmericanPublic.US, an independent public opinion research firm. The results are noteworthy because Oregon and Washington are considered among the most left-leaning in the nation, again proving that missile defense is not a partisan issue among voters.
- 71% of 300 registered voters in Oregon believe that the U.S. should have a missile defense system. By political party affiliation, 86% of Republicans, 58% of Democrats, and 66% of Independents in Oregon support missile defense.
- 72% of 300 registered voters in Washington believe that the U.S. should have a missile defense system. By political party affiliation, 86% of Republicans, 62% of Democrats, and 70% of Independents in Washington support missile defense.
- 61% in Oregon and 64% in Washington believe that missile defense is an important part of the nation’s new focus on homeland security and public safety.
- 59% in Oregon and 63% in Washington indicated that a missile defense system would make them feel safer.
- Only 21% in Oregon and 20% in Washington believe that the amount of tax dollars currently spent of missile defense (2.5% of the defense budget) is too much.
The poll also asked registered voters their opinions on how likely it was that their states would be targeted for a missile attack by a country like North Korea.
- 53% in Washington believe that a missile strike from another country is likely. 50% believe that Washington would be a likely target for a strike from North Korea.
- 49% in Oregon believe that a missile strike from another country is likely. 38% believe that Oregon would be a likely target for a strike from North Korea.
The poll results also revealed that 48% in Oregon and 41% in Washington mistakenly believe that the U.S. currently has a fully operational missile defense system with the ability to protect the nation’s cities and population from a missile attack. (Article, Link)
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NYT on Conventionally Armed ICBMs
May 31, 2006 :: New York Times :: Analysis
Michael Gordon, writing in The New York Times, discusses the Pentagon’s plan to develop a non-nuclear version of the submarine-launched Trident II intercontinental ballistic missile that could be used to attack terrorist camps, enemy missile sites, suspected caches of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, and other urgent threats. The article features portions of an interview with General James Cartwright, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, who explained the reasoning behind the move toward a non-nuclear system:
In looking for a new weapon, Cartwright said, his goal was a non-nuclear system that could respond to a threat in no more than an hour, including the time that would be needed to secure the president’s authorization to attack. … Neither bombers nor cruise missiles met Cartwright’s requirement because he reasoned that the threat might emerge in a region where the United States lacked bases or had few or no forces. It can take days for the United States to move aircraft and ships into a crisis zone and position them to strike. Bombers can attack remote targets from the United States or bases abroad, but it takes many hours to conduct such a mission. So the Strategic Command developed a plan to fit conventional warheads on existing Trident II ballistic missiles. … The weapon would give the president an option to respond quickly to the sort of immediate dangers that are most likely to become more common in the 21st century without taking the drastic step of resorting to a nuclear-armed ballistic missile.
Cartwright also outlined a number of measures that could be taken to reduce the risk of miscalculation by another nuclear power. The U.S. could notify Russia and other nations of all launches. It could allow foreign nations to monitor tests of the system. “We are going to put a target area in the ocean so people can actually see what it looks like when it hits the earth and don’t confuse this with a mushroom cloud,” Cartwright said. He added that the U.S. could also launch the missiles from parts of the ocean that would not put them on a trajectory toward Russian territory. The U.S. could also establish an American-Russian center where early warning data could be shared. (Article, Link)
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MIT Probe Rejects Postol Allegations of Fraud
May 24, 2006 :: News
Five years ago, Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accused the university’s Lincoln Laboratory of committing fraud in a missile defense study. He argued that MIT scientists were acting in bad faith when they used what he said was flawed data to deem “basically sound” the results from a 1997 test of an infrared missile sensor. In the subsequent investigation, the Department of Defense refused to release classified information to Postol and others. The accusations were left unanswered for three to four years, which Postol denounced as fraud. Last fall, a panel of four MIT professors began looking into the matter, and The Boston Globe recently reported the panel’s conclusion that MIT did not make any serious mistakes. Rather, they found that Postol himself had impeded the investigation by modifying and amending his accusations over time. “The absence of a clear, concise and consistent definition of the allegation complicated the conduct of the inquiry,” the panel said. They faulted Postol further for revealing confidential information to the media and others. (Article, Link)
» Oct. 23, 2005: The Boston Globe profiles Theodore Postol
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» Missile system details for: Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2), Patriot
Lockheed Martin Contract for PAC-3 Upgrades, 112 Interceptors
May 8, 2006 :: UPI :: News
The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command has awarded Lockheed Martin a $379 million contract for the production of 112 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles and upgrades to PAC-3 launchers. Production of all equipment will take place at facilities in Dallas and Lufkin, Texas, and Camden, Arkansas. The PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill theater air defense missile, capable of destroying tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and fixed and rotary winged aircraft. It was battle-tested during the 2003 Iraq War, when all engaged targets were destroyed. (Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
Thayer on a Summary of Missile Defense Programs
May 8, 2006 :: The Weekly Standard :: Analysis
“It’s not perfect, not yet, but we are closing in on a reliable defense to ballistic missile attack,” writes James Thayer in The Weekly Standard. While national attention is focused on the nuclear threat from Iran, MDA continues to develop and deploy systems that will knock out enemy warheads. The Pentagon is currently deploying ground-based midcourse interceptors in Alaska and California, Standard Missile-3 interceptors on Aegis-equipped warships, and a host of radars and sensors to detect and track incoming threats. It is also developing the Airborne Laser, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense, the Medium Extended Air Defense System, and other such systems. The end result is that the U.S. will soon have an integrated system of air, land, sea, and space-based missile defense assets. In addition, the Pentagon has secured critical BMD partners such as Japan, Australia, Great Britain, Israel, Germany, Italy, and possibly Canada, India, and Poland, ensuring that its initiatives have lasting international support.
Thayer notes, however, that domestic opposition to ballistic missile defense remains strong. The “scoffing” that began in the early 1980s, when Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, continues to this day unabated. MDA’s initiatives are routinely questioned, ridiculed, and condemned in the editorial pages of major U.S. newspapers and magazines. Self-proclaimed “watchdog” organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists frequently claim that there is “no basis for believing the system will have any capability to defend against real attack.” Even prominent individuals have jumped on the anti-BMD bandwagon, such as Eugene Habiger, former head of U.S. Strategic Command, who recently announced, “A system is being deployed that doesn’t have any credible capability.” If one were to pay attention to the rhetoric, it would appear as if missile defense is on its death bed.
Yet the evidence is clear that U.S. BMD is making progress, and is well on its way to becoming a reality. Soon, the U.S. will have a credible, reliable defense against ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads deployed by rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea, or even transnational terrorist organizations emanating from the Middle East and elsewhere. In the post-Cold War era, when such entities are not restrained by abstract, academic balance-of-power theories, such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), missile defense has become justifiable and inevitable. In response to those who oppose the creation of a national missile defense, Thayer writes, “Star Wars is here, now.” Assets are already in place; more will come, provided the political will is present. (Article, Link)
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Asst. Sec. DeSutter on State Department Role in Missile Defense
April 11, 2006 :: News
Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation spoke at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, on April 4 about the role of the State Department in promoting international missile defense cooperation. In addition to listing the State Department’s efforts to negotiate such arrangements, she explained the strategic rationale behind such cooperation.
Since the U.S. almost never fights alone, cooperation with allies and coalition partners to develop and deploy missile defenses allow us to make effective use of the technological marvels produced by MDA. The most advanced of our allies will bring missile defense-related sensors and interceptors to future combined operations. The use of overseas locations for sensors, ship basing, and potentially interceptors is already important to plans for the defense of the U.S. homeland, and will be important for protecting our allies and friends.
Such missile defense cooperation is vital in its own right, for the defensive benefits it provides in protecting our populations and territory from attack by rogue states armed with ballistic missiles. But missile defense is also an important nonproliferation tool, because the more defenses spread, the more unrewarding and unattractive it will be for would-be missile proliferators to invest in delivery systems which are unlikely to hit their targets. Missile defenses, in other words, deter missile proliferation. Should deterrence of these programs and their use fail, and if a rogue state launched ballistic missiles perhaps tipped with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons we would view missile defense as the “terminal phase counterproliferation.”
DeSutter added that cooperation is currently being conducted or discussed with Japan, Britain, Denmark, Australia, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, and other nations. Joint efforts include research and development, production, testing, training, and simulation exercises. (Article, Link)
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Congressman Brownback on Need for Ballistic Missile Defense
April 8, 2006 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis
In a speech yesterday at the Heritage Foundation, Congressman Sam Brownback (R-KS) discussed the emerging threats from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations. In particular, he mentioned a point seldom discussed: the vulnerability of U.S. forces in Iraq and South Korea to ballistic missile attack. According to Brownback:
We forget that it was only in 1991 that our troops during the first Gulf war were actually killed by missiles. A single SCUD missile hit a U.S. military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 of our soldiers and wounding 99.
Today, our capacity to shoot down even a relatively crude SCUD missile is not much improved from that time. Our forces in Iraq and Korea—and the civilian populations they defend—have almost no means of protection against Iranian or North Korean ballistic missiles armed with both chemical and conventional warheads.
Brownback argued that the Pentagon should review and if necessary “step up” its ballistic missile defense programs in order to guarantee the safety of these troops. (Article, Link)
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DSB Report: Missile Scientists in Short Supply
March 24, 2006 :: USA Today :: News
The Pentagon risks running out of scientists and engineers to operate and upgrade long-range missile technology, according to a report released this week by the Defense Science Board. A task force of five outside missile experts spent two years preparing the report. According to their results, approximately 20,000 research and development scientists and engineers work in the aerospace industry as a whole, down from over 140,000 in the mid-1980s. The decline reflects the fact that veteran engineers and scientists are retiring at a high rate, and fewer young engineers and scientists are choosing to work on missile technology. Each year about 70,000 Americans receive undergraduate and graduate science and engineering degrees that are defense related, compared to a combined 200,000 in China and India. The report recommends that the Pentagon pay higher salaries and offer incentives to attract more experts into the strategic missile field, or risk losing much of its expertise in long-range missile technology. (Article, Link)
» Defense Science Board Report on Future Strategic Strike Skills
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MDAA Polls New York Residents
March 22, 2006 :: MDAA :: News
Seventy percent of those living in New York State favor the deployment of a national missile defense system to protect against nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. The results come from a new poll commissioned by the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. The poll also determined that 80 percent of New Yorkers believe that New York City will be a likely target for a missile attack by countries or terrorist groups in future years. (Article, Link)
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Foreign Affairs Article on the Future of Assured Destruction
February 27, 2006 :: Analysis
Foreign Affairs this month published a major article on the future of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) written by Keir A. Lieber, assistant professor at Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania. The article argues that with the U.S. arsenal growing rapidly while Russia’s decays and China’s stays small, the era of MAD is over and the era of U.S. nuclear primacy has begun. Along these lines, Lieber and Press assert that Washington’s pursuit of nuclear primacy helps explain its missile-defense strategy. An excerpt:
Critics of missile defense argue that a national missile shield, such as the prototype the United States has deployed in Alaska and California, would be easily overwhelmed by a cloud of warheads and decoys launched by Russia or China. They are right: even a multilayered system with land-, air-, sea-, and space-based elements, is highly unlikely to protect the United States from a major nuclear attack. But they are wrong to conclude that such a missile-defense system is therefore worthless—as are the supporters of missile defense who argue that, for similar reasons, such a system could be of concern only to rogue states and terrorists and not to other major nuclear powers.
… The sort of missile defenses that the United States might plausibly deploy would be valuable primarily in an offensive context, not a defensive one—as an adjunct to a U.S. first-strike capability, not as a standalone shield. If the United States launched a nuclear attack against Russia (or China), the targeted country would be left with a tiny surviving arsenal—if any at all. At that point, even a relatively modest or inefficient missile-defense system might well be enough to protect against any retaliatory strikes, because the devastated enemy would have so few warheads and decoys left.
During the Cold War, Washington relied on its nuclear arsenal not only to deter nuclear strikes by its enemies but also to deter the Warsaw Pact from exploiting its conventional military superiority to attack Western Europe. … Now that such a mission is obsolete and the United States is beginning to regain nuclear primacy, however, Washington’s continued refusal to eschew a first strike and the country’s development of a limited missile-defense capability take on a new, and possibly more menacing, look. The most logical conclusions to make are that a nuclear-war-fighting capability remains a key component of the United States’ military doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States.
(Article, Link)
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