MissileThreat.com

Country:	Russia
Basing:	Land
In Service:	1972-1990

Details

System A-35, the predecessor to System A-135 (currently deployed), was an anti-ballistic missile system built by the Soviets during the 1960s and 1970s to protect Moscow and the surrounding region. It was designed to detect and target incoming ballistic missiles in their final descent, or terminal phase, and destroy them with medium-range interceptors.

 

By the late 1950s, it had become apparent to the Soviet Union that Moscow, and in particular, the Kremlin, was vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. On April 1958, the Politburo ordered the development of a surface-to-air missile defense system to defend the capital city. The following year, the Ministry of Defense completed performance specifications for what would become known as System A-35. As originally envisioned, the new system was to guarantee the simultaneous interception of multiple ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles.(1)

 

The problem was that, in order to defend Moscow against multiple reentry vehicles, the Soviets had to figure out a way to intercept the incoming missiles outside the atmosphere, before the warheads had time to separate. The older V-1000 surface-to-air missiles, then deployed by the Soviets, were based on aerodynamics and could not operate outside the atmosphere. Thus, System A-35 required a new weapon.(2)

 

In 1960, work began on a new medium-range interceptor missile known as the Galosh (SH-01/ABM-1). It was to be capable of intercepting its targets at a distance of over 90 kilometers. Sources indicate that, at the early stages of development, the Soviets planned to arm the Galoshes with conventional fragmentation warheads (although they were later fitted with nuclear warheads).(3)

 

By 1962, significant progress had been made on the preliminary design of System A-35, which consisted of a main command center, eight early warning radars around Moscow, and 32 battle stations. According to the design, each battle station would consist of a detection and tracking radar, a guidance radar, and eight missile launch pads. Once operational, System A-35 was to be able to intercept five or six targets simultaneously, firing two Galosh missiles at each incoming warhead. That same year, the Soviets began the construction of the new system’s facilities outside Moscow.(4)

 

In 1963, however, the Politburo ordered significant changes to the system’s design. The problem was that, as initially envisioned, System A-35 required the simultaneous operation of radars from three battle stations (i.e. six radars altogether) in order to track a single target. The 1963 decree stipulated that the system needed to deploy its radars more efficiently. Now, instead of six radars to track each incoming target, only two were to be used. In addition, the Galosh interceptors were to be armed with high-yield nuclear warheads to compensate for any reduced accuracy in the radars.(5)

 

In 1964, the Soviet engineers completed the revised preliminary design. It now consisted of 16 battle stations instead of 32 and allowed for the simultaneous interception of six to eight targets instead of the original goal of five to six. Two nuclear warheads had been designed: the first had a higher neutron yield; the second had a higher X-ray yield.(6) On November 11, 1966, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara confirmed that the Soviet Union was in the process of deploying System A-35.(7)

 

System A-35 was scheduled to be placed on active combat duty on November 7, 1967. However, that timetable proved far too ambitious. The main problem was that the system’s interceptor missiles were still incapable of intercepting ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles. Work slowed as the Politburo began to reevaluate its attitude toward the feasibility of missile defense projects. In the end, a new strategy for System A-35 was developed, one that acknowledged the impossibility of building an impenetrable missile defense system.(8)

 

In 1972, the same year that the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty, System A-35 was approved for combat duty.(9) The system was armed with nuclear-tipped Galoshes, each 20 meters long with a range of over 300 kilometers. Each Galosh carried a 2- to 3-megaton nuclear warhead.(10) Its explosion was reportedly so powerful that the interceptor did not need to hit its target directly; the massive fireball would have destroyed anything in its vicinity.(11)

 

The 64 missiles were deployed at eight battle stations (instead of 16) situated along the perimeter of Moscow near Bereya, Solnechnogorsk, Klin, and Zagorsk.(12) As a precaution, the Soviets placed dummy missiles on the launch pads for the benefit of U.S. satellites. The actual nuclear-tipped Galoshes were kept unassembled in storage depots. Protocol specified that the missiles were to be installed on the launch pads only during periods of international tension. It remains unclear how many Galoshes were actually installed.(13)

 

During the late 1970s, the Soviets decided to replace System A-35 with a new two-tiered system, one that included short- and long-range missiles capable of intercepting multiple targets and reentry vehicles. The fact was that System A-35 had been designed to handle only a limited attack by six to eight ballistic missiles, later reduced to one incoming ballistic missile. The Soviets correctly estimated that, although this provided an adequate defense by 1950s standards, the system was nearly useless against the nuclear forces of the U.S. in the 1970s.(14)

 

In 1979, the Soviets began to dismantle System A-35, while simultaneously constructing the new facilities for System A-135 and its Gazelle (SH-08/ABM-3) and Gorgon (SH-11/ABM-4) interceptors.(15) Despite its obsolescence, parts of System A-35 remained in service for over a decade. The system was finally removed from service in 1990.(16)

 

 

 

 

Footnotes

 

1. Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2001), 413.
2. Podvig, 413.
3. William T. Lee, “A Short History of Soviet Missile Defenses,” The Washington Times, 15 March 1995; Podvig, 413-414.
4. Podvig, 413-414.
5. Podvig, 413-414.
6. Podvig, 414.
7. “More Than 50 Years of Missile Defense,” The Associated Press, 1 May 2001.
8. Lee, “A Short History of Soviet Missile Defenses;” Podvig, 414-415.
9. Podvig, 416.
10. James Hackett, “Moscow’s Overlooked Missile Defenses,” The Washington Times, 17 May 2000, 19; Hans M. Kristensen, Matthew G. McKinzie, and Robert S. Norris, “The Protection Paradox,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60 (2004), 68-77; Duncan Lennox, “Battling with the Ballistic Threat,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 March 1993; GlobalSecurity.org.
11. Hackett, 19.
12. Podvig, 416.
13. Lee, “A Short History of Soviet Missile Defenses;” Podvig, 416-417.
14. Podvig, 417; Steven J. Zaloga, “Moscow’s ABM Shield Continues to Crumble,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 February 1999.
15. Christoph Bluth, “Russian Attitudes to Missile Defence,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 January 1996. 
16. Podvig, 417; Zaloga, “Moscow’s ABM Shield Continues to Crumble.”