| Country: |
North Korea |
| Alternate Name: |
Moksong 1, Pekdosan 1 |
| Class: |
MRBM |
| Basing: |
Surface based |
| Length: |
27.00 m |
| Diameter: |
1.36 m |
| Launch Weight: |
21700 kg |
| Payload: |
Single warhead |
| Warhead: |
750 kg; Nuclear, biological, chemical, HE |
| Propulsion: |
2-stage liquid |
| Range: |
2000 km |
| Status: |
Operational |
| In Service: |
1998 |
Details
The Taep’o-dong 1 is a medium-range, liquid and solid propellant, single warhead ballistic missile. There is also a three stage version, however, which can be used as a satellite launch vehicle called the Taep'o-dong SLV. It is a recent development in North Korea and represents a desperate attempt on the part of the Pyongyang to increase the range of their nuclear force. The missile can carry a nuclear warhead to a maximum range of 2,000 km (1,243 miles). The U.S. designation of Taep’o-dong was chosen by the location of where the missile was first seen; the North Korean designation is unknown.
The Taep’o-dong 1 is a crude attempt at developing a long-range missile capable of delivering a low to medium yield nuclear warhead. North Korea seeks to develop a credible threat of escalation to a nuclear level against any country that seeks to prevent its aggression against South Korea, as well as increase its ability to blackmail wealthier nations. The ultimate goal of the program is to develop a missile that can directly threaten the United States, which was achieved in the Taep’o-dong 2.
The Taep’o-dong 1 has a range of 2,000 km (1,243 miles) and is believed to use the No-dong missile as the first stage and a variant of the ‘Scud B’ or ‘Scud C’ for the second stage. It has a length of 27.0 m, a diameter of 1.36 m/0.88 m (first/second stage), has a launch weight of 21,700 kg and is equipped with a single 750 kg nuclear, biological, chemical or high-explosive warhead. Like most of the North Korean missiles, the accuracy is limited to about 3,000 m CEP but it is possible that with the proliferation of guidance technologies from the PRC that the DPRK has acquired a better guidance system for these missiles.
It is believed that the Taep’o-dong 1 started development in 1990. A space-launch version of the missile was first tested in 1998 and the military version has now reached operational status. Approximately twenty of these missiles are assumed to be active currently, though the exact count is uncertain. In June 2006 another report stated that they had 25 to 30 missiles available for testing or use. Estimation is difficult because of the decoy missiles built by North Korea. The missile will likely be proliferated in much the same way as past North Korean designs—Iranian and Pakistani personnel were involved in the first test launch. It is probable that future Iranian and Pakistani missiles will integrate Taep’o-dong technology.(1)
Footnotes
- Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems 46 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2007), 97-98.
Sixth Anniversary of North Korean ICBM Launch
August 31, 2004 :: News
Six years ago today, in 1998, North Korea surprised the world with the launch of long range Taepo Dong I missile, which traveled over Japan and eventually fell into the Pacific. Mainstream intelligence analysts were flummoxed; since North Korea had hitherto only tested its much more primitive No Dong missile, they were not considering other possibilities. Thus providing an example of what the 9-11 Commission would later term a “failure of imagination.”
In fact, the launch was of an SLV, a space launch vehicle, designed to put into orbit a small radio broadcasting the immortal hymns of Kim Jong Il. This simply means that the missile was put on a slightly different trajectory, to go into orbit rather than deliver a warhead to another spot on the ground. That the launch failed did not diminish the importance of the test for military applications, showing that North Korea had the capability for long range missiles—even if in this case the final stage did not reach orbit.
The launch did not come as a complete surprise to all parties, however, especially the nine members of the Rumsfeld Commission, who just weeks before had completed their report warning that a rogue nation could deploy an intercontinental range missile—the Taepo Dong I classified as such, by virtue of its range—within five years of doing so, if only by strapping together smaller and fairly primitive Scud missiles. The test, in combination with the Rumsfeld Committee’s bold but unanimous report, were instrumental in reenergizing the push for missile defenses. The next year, Congress passed and Clinton signed H.R. 4—”The National Missile Defense Act of 1999”—into law, which stated that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. Clinton signed the law because it was politically impossible to do otherwise. While the law stated that missile defenses should be deployed when technologically feasible, Clinton added four reasons that would guide any decision about whether or not to deploy, namely four good enough excuses to provide a basis for why he would not carry this law into execution. The same law is frequently cited as the basis for the Bush administrations beginning to deploy a limited system in Alaska, due later this year if all goes as planned. (Link)
» Rumsfeld Report text
» National Missile Defense Act of 1999 text
» More stories on: North Korea
» Missile details: Taep'o-dong 1 SLV, Taep'o-dong 1
Patriot Batteries To Go To South Korea
April 30, 2004 :: News
The United States will be adding to its Patriot interceptors in South Korea, with two additional batteries of Patriot Advanced Capability 2 and 3, according to a press release by the US and South Korean Combined Forces Command in Seoul. The batteries will be added at Gwangju Air Base, with the U.S. Eighth Army’s 35th Air Defense Brigade.
Six Patriot batteries were stationed in South Korea’s major bases since 1994. A battery is composed of eight launchers of PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles, each having 4 and 16 interceptors, respectively.
In 1998, North Korea fired a Taepo-Dong I missile over Japan. (Article, Link)
» May 6: KCNA news agency, Pyongyang: U.S. to deploy Patriots against North Korea “escalated military threat”
» May 4: EastAsia Intel report on Patriot xfer
» More stories on: Land-Based Systems, North Korea
» Missile details: Taep'o-dong 1
» Missile system details for: Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2), Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
