September 8, 1944 The Missile Age began when the first German V-2 missile struck London.
July 4, 1945 A delegation of American officers, which went to Europe to investigate the use of ballistic missiles during World War II, recommended that the U.S. undertake a research and development program to develop defenses against ballistic missiles.
December 1945 Army Air Force Science Advisory Group broaches the idea of using an “energy beam” for defenses against ballistic missiles.
March 4, 1946 The Army Air Forces, precursor of the U.S. Air Force, initiated two long term studies, Projects Thumper and Wizard, that were to explore the feasibility of developing interceptor missiles that could destroy missiles moving as fast as 4,000 miles per hour at an altitude as high as 500,000 feet.
May 29, 1946 The Stilwell Board Report, which had been convened in November 1945 to determine what equipment U.S. ground forces would require following World War II, recommended the development of defenses against ballistic missiles. The report stated:
“Guided missiles, winged or nonwinged, traveling at extreme altitudes and at velocities in excess of supersonic speed, are inevitable. Intercontinental ranges of over 3,000 miles and payload[s] sufficient to carry atomic explosive[s] are to be expected. Remotely controlled, and equipped with homing devices designed to be attracted to sound, metal, or heat, such missiles would be incapable of interception with any existing equipment such as fighter aircraft and antiaircraft fire. Guided interceptor missiles, dispatched in accordance with electronically computed data obtained from radar detection stations, will be required.”
1955 After 50,000 ballistic missile intercepts on an analog computer, Bell Laboratory scientists conclude that “hitting a bullet with another bullet” is indeed possible.
1957 Work begins on the Nike-Zeus project, the first major missile defense effort by the United States.
October 4, 1957 Sputnik is launched into space, initiating the era of long-range ballistic missiles.
January 16, 1958 Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy assigned primary responsibility for the ballistic missile defense mission to the U.S. Army, ordering the Air Force to scale back its Project Wizard and make the radar and command and control equipment from this project compatible with the Army’s Nike Zeus ballistic missile defense system.
1958-1968 Project Defender, a wide-ranging research and development program that explores the use of a 400 foot diameter web as a hit-to-kill system for boost-phase intercepts, is begun.
March 4, 1961 According to one report, the Soviets completed the first interception and destruction of a missile warhead. An official report described this intercept as follows:
“The V-1000 antimissile was launched according to a computer command. The detonation of the antimissile’s high-explosive fragmentation warhead was conducted at an altitude of 25 km according to a command from earth from a computer after which, based upon data from the film recorder, the ballistic missile warhead began to fall apart.”
July 19, 1962 During a test over the Pacific Ocean, a Nike Zeus missile fired from the Army’s Kwajalein test facility intercepted a dummy warhead from an Atlas ICBM. Although the Zeus only came within two kilometers of the warhead, this was close enough so that the nuclear warhead of a fully operational Zeus would have destroyed the ICBM warhead.
December 22, 1962 A Nike-Zeus missile came within 200 meters of a reentry vehicle during a simulated intercept over the Pacific Ocean. Nike-Zeus is replaced with the Nike-X program, which employs two types of nuclear tipped interceptors and the new phased array radar.
November 10, 1966 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara informed the American people that the Soviets were deploying their Galosh ballistic missile defense system.
June 23, 1967 At the Glassboro summit, President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to convince Soviet Premier Alexsei N. Kosygin that the Soviets should abandon their effort to deploy missile defenses, for the U.S. would merely have to add more nuclear warheads to its ICBM force to overcome these defenses. This elicited the following response from Kosygin: “Defense is moral; offense is immoral!”
September 18, 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to deploy the Sentinel ballistic missile defense system. This was to be a two-tiered defensive system that employed two interceptors: the Spartan and the Sprint, both of which were nuclear-tipped. The Spartan intercepted warheads and decoys outside the atmosphere. The Sprint intercepted warheads within the atmosphere where air resistance would strip away decoys and make it easier to find the attacking warheads. The system itself was designed to protect the U.S. from the so-called “Nth country threat,” an attack by unsophisticated ICBMs such as those the People’s Republic of China was building.
The Pentagon announces the decision to deploy the two-layer Sentinel ABM system (which succeeded Nike-X) consisting of the nuclear tipped Spartan (long range) and Sprint (short range) interceptors in order to protect the U.S. from the “Nth country threat” of simple ICBMs such as those deployed by China.
July 1, 1968 President Johnson announces that the U.S. and the USSR will discuss limits on both strategic nuclear arsenals and ballistic missile defenses. Talks are canceled when Moscow invades Czechoslovakia in September.
February 6, 1969 The Nixon Administration halts Sentinel deployment pending a full review of U.S. strategic programs.
March 14, 1969 President Richard Nixon announced his decision to deploy a missile defense system designed essentially to protect U.S. ICBM fields from attack by Soviet missiles. This system retained the same missiles that were to be deployed as part of the Johnson administration’s Sentinel system. The re-oriented missile defense system was renamed Safeguard. The overall plan for Safeguard included the option to expand the system so that it could become a population defense against the “Nth country threat.”
August 1969 The Senate votes for deployment of the Safeguard system with Vice President Spiro Agnew casting the tie-breaking vote.
November 17, 1969 The United States and the Soviet Union begin the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) on limiting both ABM defensive systems and strategic nuclear offensive systems.
May 26, 1972 U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT I agreements which include the ABM Treaty. This treaty limited the Soviets and the U.S. to the deployment of two ABM sites, each having 100 interceptors. One site was to guard an ICBM field, the other would protect the national command authorities at each nation’s capital city. A 1974 protocol reduced the number of permitted sites to one. President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign two basic SALT I documents in Moscow, an Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons, and the ABM Treaty, limiting strategic defensive systems.
The ABM Treaty constrains strategic defenses to a total of 200 launchers and interceptors, 100 at each of two widely separated deployment areas. These restrictions are intended to prevent the establishment of a nationwide defense or the creation of a base for deploying such a defense. The treaty also codifies the principle of “non-interference” by one party with the national technical means of verification of the other, thereby protecting the right of overflight by reconnaissance satellites. In addition, the ABM Treaty establishes the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to handle treaty-related compliance and implementation issues.
July 3, 1974 The United States and the Soviet Union sign a protocol reducing the number of ABM deployment areas permitted to each side from two to one, and the number of ABM launchers and interceptors from 200 to 100.
October 1, 1975 The Nekoma, ND (Grand Forks) Safeguard ABM site becomes operational.
October 2, 1975 The House of Representatives votes to close the Grand Forks site because the new Soviet multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) program would easily overwhelm Safeguard. Vulnerability to direct attack and technical problems such as radar blinding by electromagnetic pulse from exploding nuclear warheads made the system unreliable, and even actually threatened Minuteman forces it was assigned to protect.
November 18, 1975 The Senate votes to terminate the Safeguard system.
1975-1976 A single U.S. Safeguard ABM deployment site with 100 launchers and interceptors and associated radars is completed at Grand Forks, North Dakota. High operating costs and limited capabilities lead to a decision to deactivate the site in 1976. The main radar at Grand Forks becomes part of the North American Air Defense Command missile early warning system.
February 1976 The Grand Forks site goes into “caretaker status.”
November 1, 1978 The SCC concludes an Agreed Statement to the ABM Treaty to establish rules for the use of air defense radars at ABM test ranges and to clarify the meaning of the term “tested in an ABM mode.” Under this statement, an interceptor missile is deemed tested in an ABM mode if it has attempted to intercept a strategic ballistic missile or its elements (i.e., reentry vehicles) in flight trajectory.
July 31, 1979 Ronald Reagan, Republican presidential hopeful, visited the NORAD Command Post under Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs. Here, Reagan saw a demonstration of the command and control facilities the U.S. would use to alert U.S. retaliatory forces and the American people in case of nuclear war. He was upset to learn that there was nothing the U.S. could do to defend itself against missile attacks. Shortly after this, he decided to make missile defenses a part of his national security policy if he were elected president
January 8, 1982 A group of private advisors headed by Mr. Karl R. Bendetsen briefed President Reagan in the Oval Office, recommending that he launch an emergency national program to develop missile defenses. This effort should be patterned after the Manhattan District Project that produced America’s atomic bomb during World War II.
February 11, 1983 After months of considering the strategic issues raised by America’s inability to field the MX missile as a response to the growing ability of the Soviets to deliver an effective first strike against U.S. ICBMs, the Joint Chiefs unanimously recommended to President Reagan that the U.S. begin to pursue a national security strategy that would place increased emphasis on strategic defenses.
March 23, 1983 In an address to the nation, U.S. President Ronald Reagan announces his intention to commit the United States to a research program, “consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty,” that will study the feasibility of defensive measures against ballistic missiles to maintain the peace. The program comes to be known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
President Reagan expresses his desire to find “the means of rendering… nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” He calls for “a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.”
March 24, 1983 Opponents in Congress label President Reagan’s vision of a defensive umbrella “Star Wars.”
March 25, 1983 The policy announced in the 23 March speech was formalized in National Security Decision Directive 85.
April 18, 1983 President Reagan issued guidance calling for the completion of a two-part study. One study would assess the state of missile defense technology and recommend a technology program for the new missile defense program. The second part would assess the strategic and policy implications of such a program. The first study became known as the Defensive Technologies Study or the Fletcher Report, and the second study became known as the Future Security Strategy Study (sometimes called the Hoffman Report). Two evaluations are begun, one to look at the state of ABM technology and recommend a way forward (Defense Technologies Study or the Fletcher Report), the second to assess strategy and policy ramifications of the ABM effort (Future Security Strategy Study or Hoffman Report).
July-August 1983 The United States reveals that it has detected a large early warning radar under construction near the city of Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union. This installation is roughly 800 kilometers from the nearest border and thus in violation of the ABM Treaty (which requires that all such radars be located on a nation’s periphery and oriented outward). The United States raises the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar in the fall 1983 SCC session.
October 1983 The Hoffman Report is completed. It states that missile defenses could enhance deterrence and development of tactical missile defenses could contribute toward development of a NMD system. The initial draft of the Fletcher Report is completed. It recommends two research options, one funded at $20.9 billion between Fiscal Years 1984-1989 and a less preferred, more fiscally restrained alternative.
1983 Iran started its chemical weapons program.
1984 Iran produces its first chemical weapons agent.
1984 SDIO’s master plan concentrates directed energy research on five technologies: space-based chemical weapons; ground-based laser weapons; space-based particle beam weapons; nuclear (X-ray) directed energy; and support subsystems for these weapons.
January 6, 1984 Presidential National Security Decision Directive 119 established the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to explore the possibility of developing missile defenses as an alternative means of deterring nuclear war. The technology plan developed by the Fletcher committee was to be the general guide for initiating this program. This directive also made the Secretary of Defense responsible for the new program. The emphasis in the program was to be on non-nuclear developments, although research work on defensive nuclear devices was to continue “as a hedge against a Soviet ABM breakout.”
January 23, 1984 The Reagan administration issues the first of a series of reports on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. This report deems the Krasnoyarsk radar an outright violation of the ABM Treaty.
March 27, 1984 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appointed Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, U.S. Air Force, as first Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO).
April 24, 1984 Secretary Weinberger signed the first charter for SDIO. This charter was specifically designed to be general in nature to give the organization’s first director extensive leeway in managing the program. The charter also specified
June 10, 1984 The core of the Army’s new hit-to-kill interceptor technology was successfully demonstrated in the homing overlay experiment. In this demonstration, a test intercept vehicle was launched from Kwajalein Missile Range aboard a modified Minuteman rocket. Also riding on the Minuteman was an infrared sensor package and an on-board computer. The interceptor itself carried a computer and an infrared sensor package for guidance; it was also equipped with a kill device that resembled the folded skeleton of an umbrella with weights attached to its ribs. Once above the atmosphere, the sensor and computer in the Minuteman located and tracked a re-entry vehicle that had been launched from Vandenberg AFB by a second Minuteman missile. Then, the on-board computer of the launch rocket passed tracking data to the computer on the intercept vehicle. At the appropriate time, the interceptor package was launched and homed in on the target using its own infrared sensor and on-board computer. Once free of the mother ship, the kill vehicle deployed its umbrella structure, crashed into the target vehicle, and destroyed it. This successful intercept followed partial successes in two other test flights.
March 12, 1985 The United States and the Soviet Union begin the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva (see section 4, March 12, 1985). In the Defense and Space Talks (DST) portion of the NST, the United States seeks to discuss a transition from deterrence based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to increased reliance on defenses, either ground- or space-based, against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union, in response to the U.S. SDI program, seeks a comprehensive ban on research, development, testing, and deployment of “space-strike arms.”
April 1985 The controversy over narrow vs. broad interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty gets underway.
September 6, 1985 The Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser destroyed a Titan booster rigged to simulate the conditions of a thrusting rocket booster.
October 6, 1985 U.S. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane introduces a new, “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty on national television. Under the “broad” interpretation, space-based and mobile ABM systems and components that are based on “other physical principles” (i.e., lasers, particle beams) may be developed and tested but not deployed. Under the traditional, or “narrow,” interpretation of the treaty, the development and testing, but not the deployment, of ABM systems based on other physical principles are allowed only for fixed, land-based systems and components.
October 11, 1985 President Reagan determines that the “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty is fully justified. However, the president directs that, as a matter of policy, the SDI program will continue to be conducted according to its more restrictive interpretation.
November 1, 1985 The United States tables a proposal at the DST with the following major provisions:
A commitment to jointly explore how a cooperative transition could be accomplished should new defensive technologies prove possible. An “open laboratories” arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other’s strategic defense research programs and provide for visits to associated laboratories.
December 1985 Two reviews of SDIO are completed. The first finds SDIO is undermanned to fulfill its charter and needs to be reorganized. The second finds that developing computing and battle management software are “the paramount strategic problem[s]” facing SDIO.
July 30, 1986 General Abrahamson directed that SDIO be reorganized. The new organizational structure featured two principal deputies: Brigadier General Malcolm O’Neill became the Deputy for Programs and Systems, and Dr. Lou Marquet became the Deputy for Technology. The reorganization was based upon the Esposito Study of SDIO’s organizational requirements (see December 1985 entry above). This change in SDIO’s organization signalled the rising importance being assigned to system/architectural designs and was an indication that SDIO was resolving some of the technical issues it faced when the program began.
August 1986 A National Test Bed is established to help resolve problems associated with integrating battle management requirements.
September 11, 1986 The Delta 180 experiment, the first “equivalent” of boost phase intercept, is completed.
October 11-12, 1986 At a meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev nearly agree to significant reductions of offensive ballistic missiles (see section 4, October 11-12, 1986). Sharp differences over SDI, however, prevent a settlement.
In response to a Soviet proposal that the United States provide a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the United States offers to accept such a commitment until 1996 contingent upon:
A 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive forces of the United States and the Soviet Union by 1991. Elimination by 1996 of all U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles. Agreement that either side could deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996 unless both sides agreed otherwise. In conjunction with a commitment to abide by the ABM Treaty, General Secretary Gorbachev seeks to ban the testing of space-based “elements” of a missile defense system outside of laboratories. President Reagan rejects this proposal because of its potential impact on the SDI program.
September 11, 1986 SDIO completed the Delta 180 experiment. During this experiment, SDIO completed what was the first equivalent of a boost phase intercept of a target. Additionally, this experiment involved a number of sophisticated sensor experiments, including the collection of data from space on a booster vehicle launched from the White Sands Missile Test Range in New Mexico.
October 11-12, 1986 U.S. President Ronald Reagan and U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Gorbachev held their second summit meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland. During this meeting, Gorbachev pressed Reagan heavily to accept limitations on the SDI program as a pre-condition for other agreements restricting offensive arms. Reagan refused to accept Gorbachev’s proposed restrictions on SDI.
December 4, 1986 While attending a meeting of NATO’s defense ministers in Brussels, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced the award of seven SDI contracts for the first phase of a theater missile defense architectural study competition. Contracts of $2 million were awarded to each of seven European and American prime contractor teams which were to complete their work by July 1987. They would then compete for further contracts based on the results of their phase one studies.
April 15, 1987 During meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz makes a new U.S. DST proposal:
Both the United States and the Soviet Union would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This commitment would be contingent on the implementation of agreed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) reductions. After 1994, either side could deploy defensive systems of its choosing, unless mutually agreed otherwise. The United States also proposes that both sides annually exchange data on their planned strategic defense activities, provide reciprocal briefings on their respective strategic defense efforts, permit visits to associated research facilities, and agree to procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.
May 11, 1987 Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Advisor, completed his study of how the ABM Treaty affected the SDI program. The report was released on 13 May. Briefly, Sofaer concluded that the Treaty did not preclude testing of space-based missile defense systems, including directed energy weapons.
May 13, 1987 A legal review of the 1972 ABM Treaty concludes that the Treaty does not prevent testing space-based missile defenses, including directed energy weapons.
June/July 1987 As a result of a Defense Acquisition Board review of the SDI program, the baseline architecture for Phase I is approved and the program begins the demonstration and validation phase of the DoD acquisition process.
July 29, 1987 The SDI Organization and the Army’s Strategic Defense Command announced the selection of five phase I contractor teams which were to be invited to participate in the second phase of the SDI Theater Missile Defense Architecture Study. Contracts were expected to be completed in September with each team having until July 1988 to refine its architectural concept. The value of each contract was to very from $4.5 million to $7 million depending upon the exercise of contract options.
November 4, 1987 A Patriot with the PAC-2 modifications successfully destroyed another Patriot missile that was simulating the flight of an SS-23 missile.
December 7-10, 1987 At a summit meeting in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agree to seek an agreement on the DST that would require both nations to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time for the purpose of deploying advanced defenses.
January 19, 1988 Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) delivered a speech to the Arms Control Association calling for a reorientation of the SDI program. Nunn called for the new SDI program to focus first on developing a “limited system for protecting against accidental and unauthorized missile launches.” A longer range goal of the program would be to develop a more comprehensive defensive system.
January 22, 1988 The United States tables a draft DST treaty that includes the following provisions:
Entry into force contingent upon entry into force of START. Unlimited duration, with a “specified period” of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to be negotiated. Continued observance of the ABM Treaty through that period. After the “specified period,” either party is free to choose its own course of action, including deployment of strategic missile defenses that are prohibited by the ABM Treaty, upon six months’ written notice of its intention to do so.
March 17, 1988 The United States proposes a draft Predictability Protocol to the draft DST treaty. The protocol includes provisions for:
An annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities. Annual meetings of experts to review the data exchanged and plan further measures, cited below:
Reciprocal briefings on strategic defense efforts; Reciprocal visits to associated research facilities; and Reciprocal observations of strategic defense tests.
March 22-23, 1988 At a Washington meeting of Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the United States presents a new initiative that would permit the development, testing, or deployment of space-based sensors without restriction.
August 31, 1988 In a unilateral statement following the Third U.S.-Soviet Review Conference on the ABM Treaty, the United States states that: “Since the Soviet Union was not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation…the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the treaty. In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future.”
September 30, 1988 The SDI Organization was realigned. Among the major changes was the addition of several new positions. A chief of staff was added to oversee the activities of the SDIO staff. The addition of a chief engineer ensured the many engineering tasks and analysis efforts would receive the top-level management attention they required. Another major change was the creation of the Resource Management Directorate by merging the Comptroller and Support Services Directorates, a move designed to increase management efficiency. In another part of the change, the Programs and Systems Deputate was redesignated the Systems Deputate. Within this last office, a major goal of the reorganization was to achieve better integration and management of the six SDS Phase I elements by placing them under the Phase I program office within the Systems Deputate. A further change involved giving the Architectures and Analysis Directorate, which was formerly the Follow-On Phase Architectures Directorate, additional strength so that it could better address “alternative and innovative architectures.”
January 26, 1989 President George Bush’s nominee for secretary of defense, John Tower says, “I don’t believe that we can devise a [BMD] umbrella that can protect the entire American population from nuclear incineration. I think that’s unrealistic.” The New York Times reports that Tower’s comments are “a milestone in the history of the anti-missile program.” Bush’s new secretary of defense, Dick Cheney and other administration officials continue to echo Tower’s sentiments.
February 1, 1989 Lt. Gen. George L. Monahan, Jr., became the second director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, succeeding General Abrahamson who retired at the end of January.
February 9, 1989 General Abrahamson’s end of tour report contained a strong recommendation of the Brilliant Pebbles concept. Abrahamson stated that an entire space-based architecture based on Brilliant Pebbles could be deployed in five years for a cost of no more than $25 billion. President George Bush announces in an address to a Joint Session of Congress that he will “vigorously pursue” the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDIO chief General Abrahamson, in his end of tour report, says that a space-based defensive architecture employing the “Brilliant Pebbles” concept could be ready in 5 years at a cost of $25 billion or less. Brilliant Pebbles consists of thousands of interceptors each capable of independent operations against whatever comes within its field of vision.
March 3, 1989 President George H. W. Bush ordered a general review of U.S. national defense strategy.
April 25, 1989 At a congressional hearing, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney says that budget limitations will delay the development of SDI programs. Cheney also says that the Bush administration will emphasize “Brilliant Pebble,” a missile defense concept in which thousands of small interceptor rockets orbiting in space would home in on enemy missiles and destroy them in their boost phase.
June 14, 1989 Based upon his administration’s review of U.S. security requirements, President Bush concluded that the goals of the SDI program were generally sound and that the program should continue in such a way as to offer the possibility of a deployment decision in the next few years. Emphasis in this effort was to be directed toward perfecting boost-phase kill technologies such as Brilliant Pebbles. In support of these directions, Bush directed DOD to carry out an independent review of the SDI program and to have this review finished in the fall of 1989.
September 22-23, 1989 During two days of meetings between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the state of Wyoming, progress is made in several areas:
The Soviet Union drops its linkage between achieving a DST agreement on the future of ABM systems and completing and implementing START. The Soviet Union indicates, however, that it reserves the right to withdraw from the START treaty if the United States does not abide by the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union agrees to eliminate its illegal radar at Krasnoyarsk without preconditions—a long-standing U.S. requirement for the signing of any strategic arms control treaty. Secretary Baker invites Soviet experts to visit two U.S. laboratories involved in SDI research.
October 23, 1989 In a speech to the Soviet Parliament, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze acknowledges that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the ABM Treaty and repeats the pledge to dismantle the installation.
March - April 1990 The United States proposes an executive agreement, not tied to the ABM Treaty, on predictability measures in the field of strategic missile defense. The proposal, which is designed to build confidence, would involve the exchange of data on defensive programs, meetings of experts, briefings, visits to laboratories, observations of tests, and notifications of ABM tests.
March 15, 1990 Ambassador Henry F. Cooper submitted the report of his independent survey of the SDI program. Here, Cooper endorsed the concept of Brilliant Pebbles and spelled out the concept that became the system for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).
June 30, 1990 Lt. Gen. George L. Monahan, Jr., retired from the Air Force.
July 10, 1990 President George Bush appointed Ambassador Henry F. Cooper to the position of Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.
August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait.
October 24, 1990 The FY 1991 Appropriations Conference Committee Report, H. Rep. 101-938 called for the Secretary of Defense to establish a centrally managed Theater Missile Defense (TMD) program funded at $218.249 million for FY 1991. The conference committee report also required the Defense Department to accelerate R&D on theater and tactical ballistic missile defense systems. While Congress recognized that it was too early to determine the baseline for a tactical ballistic missile defense (TMD) system, it asked the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan by 1 March 1991 for determining a TMD baseline system and then developing and fielding this system. Once determined, this plan was to be funded fully in DOD’s Six Year Defense Program (1992-1997). Furthermore, the plan was to take account of Air Force and Navy requirements and include participation of these services.
November 9, 1990 The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition assigned to SDIO the responsibility for the Defense Department’s centrally managed Theater Missile Defense program.
January 17, 1991 U.S.-led coalition forces in the Middle East began military operations against Iraqi forces.
January 18, 1991 According to press reports, for the first time in history, an anti-missile missile intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile under combat conditions. A Patriot air defense missile destroyed an Iraqi Scud missile that was attacking a U.S. air base in Saudi Arabia. The crew that fired the Patriot missile was led by First Lieutenant Charles McMurtrey of Montgomery, Alabama. The Patriot was launched against the Scud at 4:28 a.m. local time. A reporter for the Los Angeles Times wrote: “The age of ‘Star Wars’ had arrived.” After the end of the Gulf War, questions were raised about whether or not this first “kill” actually occurred. This was part of a general public debate about the operational effectiveness of the Patriot system that began soon after hostilities ended and continued for about two years.
January 29, 1991 In his State of the Union address, President Bush announces a change in the mission of the SDI program from defense against a large-scale ballistic missile attack to “providing protection against limited ballistic missile strikes — whatever their source.” The new Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program would include some 1,000 space-based “Brilliant Pebbles” interceptors, 750 to 1,000 long-range ground-based interceptors at six sites, space-based and mobile sensors, and transportable theater ballistic missile defenses. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush formally announced the shift in focus in the SDI program to the concept known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. The president stated:
“I have directed that the Strategic Defense Initiative program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas and to our friends and allies.”
April 28-May 6,1991 The Discovery space shuttle provides SDIO officials 17 “engine firings” against different backgrounds (earth, black space) which aid the development of sensors to detect missile launches.
June 13, 1991 The Soviet Union makes a formal, unilateral statement that START “may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance” with the ABM Treaty. The United States replies, in a formal unilateral statement, that “changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability” of the START Treaty.
September 27, 1991 President Bush announces unilateral cuts in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and calls upon the Soviet leadership “to join us in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes — whatever their source — without undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces.”
October 3, 1991 The United States tables a new proposal in the DST indicating it is “prepared to discuss specific limits on the scope and timing of defense deployments” to permit the United States and the Soviet Union to implement GPALS while retaining confidence in each side’s deterrent offensive forces.
February 25, 1991 A Scud missile struck a barracks housing Army reservists, killing 28 soldiers. Later, a monument was constructed at the entrance to the headquarters of the 14th Quartermaster Detachment at Greensburg, Pennsylvania, in honor of 13 of the 28 people killed.
March 30, 1991 The Defense Department dispatched the Theater Missile Defense Report to Congress. This report was submitted in response to directions contained in the FY 1991 Appropriations Conference Committee Report (see 24 Oct 90 entry above). This report informed Congress that the SDIO would be the centralized management office for the theater and tactical missile defense programs and advised that SDIO would establish a “managerial position as Deputy for TMD, equal in status to the Deputies for technology and strategic programs.” This new office was established as part of the reorganization announced on 15 March by SDIO Director Ambassador Henry Cooper.
April 23, 1991 General Donald Kutyna, USAF, commander of the U.S. Space Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that U.S. control of space enhanced the effectiveness of coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War. The U.S. must plan in the future on having the means to control space by attacking the space assets of a possible enemy. The general also pointed out that General Norman Schwarzkof, commander of the coalition’s forces, was able to move his troops without the movements being detected by the Iraqis because of our control of air and the fact that Iraq had no space reconnaissance assets.
April 28 - May 6, 1991 At 7:33 AM EST on 28 April, the space shuttle Discovery blasted off from Cape Canaveral with several major SDIO experiments aboard. The launch, originally scheduled for 26 February, had been delayed because of a number of difficulties with the space shuttle. One of the more interesting facets of the experiments carried out on this mission was the shuttle’s execution of a maneuver known as the “Malarkey Milkshake.” This maneuver was part of an experiment that observed the firing of the shuttle’s engines against various backgrounds, e.g., against the earth, against black space, against the earth’s limb, etc. Planners for this experiment had expected to get a minimum of six views of the shuttle’s engines firing and hoped for as many as twelve; they actually observed the firing engines seventeen times. The shuttle mission ended at 2:56 p.m. EDT on 6 May when the Discovery landed at Cape Canaveral.
December 5, 1991 President George Bush signed into law H.R. 2100, the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993.” That portion of H.R. 2100 dealing with missile defenses was known as the Missile Defense Act of 1991. This act required the Defense Department to “aggressively pursue the development of advanced theater missile defense systems, with the objective of down selecting and deploying such systems by the mid-1990s.” Additionally, DOD was to “develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost-effective, operationally effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant antiballistic missile system at a single site as the initial step toward deployment of an antiballistic missile system.” This system was to be “designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or Third World attacks.”
December 8, 1991 Three Soviet republics (Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia) formed a commonwealth and declared Gorbachev’s government “dead.” This effectively marked the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
March 13, 1992 In its second hit-to-kill attempt, the ERIS kill vehicle misses its target warhead by several meters.
January 13, 1992 Russia announces its succession to the Soviet Union in all treaties.
January 28, 1992 President Bush, in his annual State of the Union address, calls for congressional support “in funding a program to protect our country from limited ballistic missile attack.”
January 31, 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin, in an address to the United Nations Security Council, reaffirms Russia’s “allegiance” to the ABM Treaty, calling it “an important factor in maintaining strategic stability in the world.” He proposes elimination of existing anti-satellite (ASAT) programs and suggests a ban on weapons especially designed to destroy satellites.
President Yeltsin also announces that Russia is “ready to develop, then create and jointly operate, a global defense system instead of the SDI system.” President Yeltsin says he is calling for the United States and Russia “to jointly devise a global system for protection from space,” while both sides continue to “faithfully observe…all of the provisions” of the ABM Treaty.
May 1992 House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin raises the specter that “in this new [post-Cold War] world” the U.S. cannot assume that nuclear equipped adversaries will “always be rational or at least operate with the same logic as we do.”
May 1, 1992 Ambassador Henry Cooper concluded a memorandum of agreement with the secretaries of the military services that established the organizational structures and procedures for handling the acquisition of the GPALS system as DOD moved ahead with deploying missile defenses in accordance with instructions contained in the Missile Defense Act of 1991. Among the more important provisions of this MOA were that SDIO would establish a General Manager’s function, headed by a three-star general, that would be responsible for working with the military services in the management of procurement actions. The General Manager would work through GPALS program executive officers (PEO) that each military service would appoint. The PEOs were to be of flag rank. Each PEO was to have authority over all program managers within his or her service who were completing SDI work in accordance with program management agreements worked out between SDIO and the military services
July 1992 The Department of Energy cancels the last test of the six year old proposed X-Ray laser weapon system, effectively ending the program which had been suffering from technical problems, funding shortfalls, and competition from other non-nuclear based technologies.
June 17, 1992 At a summit meeting in Washington, the United States and Russia agree to create “a high-level group to explore on a priority basis” the concept of a Global Protection System (GPS). The group will discuss:
“The potential for sharing of early warning information through the establishment of an early warning center. “The potential for cooperation with participating states in developing ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies. The development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement a GPS.”
July 2, 1992 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney dispatched to Congress the 180-Day Report required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. This report outlined the Defense Department’s acquisition strategy in support of the deployment goals set by the Missile Defense Act of 1991. This strategy would allow the U.S. to deploy a user operational evaluation system (UOES) to provide limited protection of the U.S. by 1997. Where theater missile defenses were concerned, the basic strategy was to upgrade existing defensive capabilities such as those possessed by the Patriot and then to produce an advanced, new generation system with greater range and effectiveness. The advanced system was to be the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which was to have a contingency capability as early as 1996.
September 21-22, 1992 At the second U.S.-Russian meeting on GPS after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States tables a protocol to the ABM Treaty that would:
Permit six sites with 150 interceptors each. Permit unlimited ABM development and testing. Permit unlimited space-based sensor development and testing. Redefine “testing in an ABM mode” to permit more capable theater ballistic missile defenses. Permit the transfer of ABM systems to other states. The protocol would last for 10 years, at which time either side would be free to deploy space-based defenses.
October 1, 1992 House and Senate Conferees agreed to the provisions that were to be included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. This law amended the Missile Defense Act of 1991 by placing more emphasis on treaty compliance in any National Missile Defense the U.S. might choose to deploy and by eliminating the target date of 1996 for deployment of the initial NMD site. Finally, the requirement to deploy advanced theater missile defenses by the mid-1990s was eliminated and replaced with a requirement to develop advanced theater missile defense systems for deployment.
October 9, 1992 At Bishkek, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) sign an agreement pledging to support and implement the ABM Treaty.
November 3, 1992 During his campaign for the U.S. presidency, Bill Clinton renounces the goal of a space-based defense system and supports the development of an option for “a limited missile defense system within the strict framework” of the ABM Treaty. Clinton, who is elected president on November 3, also supports the development and deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) systems “to protect our troops from short- and medium-range missiles.”
December 10, 1992 SDIO, U.S. Space Command, and the U.S. Air Force signed a memorandum of agreement that started the process of transferring ownership of the National Test Facility to the Air Force, with the final transfer coming at a later time as agreed to by the three signatories to the agreement.
January 3, 1993 Nearly three weeks before he is to leave office, President Bush signs the START II agreement with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, which would reduce nuclear arsenals once again, to 3,000- 3,500 warheads each by 2003.
January 7, 1993 Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, director SDIO, submitted a letter of resignation to President George Bush, with the resignation to be effective 20 January.
May 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin renames SDIO the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and reorients its priorities to developing theater missile defenses.
May 13 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was being redesignated the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to reflect the new focus in DOD’s missile defense program and the new way in which the program would be managed. The major change in management was that the organization would no longer report directly to the secretary of defense, but rather to the under secretary of defense for acquisition. Concerning the refocusing of the program, Secretary Aspin noted that the end of the Cold war meant that the U.S. no longer faced the threat of a massive Soviet attack such as that the SDI program had concentrated on. Now, the U.S. faced theater ballistic missiles in the hands of Third World dictators; these missiles could pose a threat to our forces and to the forces and peoples of our allies. Additionally, in the future, the U.S. could “face hostile or irrational states that have both nuclear warheads and ballistic missile technology that could reach the United States. . . . That’s why we’ve made theater ballistic missile defense our first priority to cope with the new dangers of the post-Cold War era.” The next priority was developing defenses for the American people.
July 13, 1993 A senior U.S. government official informs the Congress that “it is the position of the Clinton administration that the ‘narrow,’ or ‘traditional,’ interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the correct interpretation and, therefore, that the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to technology utilized” (see October 6, 1985).
August 4, 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that President Clinton has nominated Major General Malcolm O’Neill, BMDO Acting Director, for the position of BMDO Director with promotion to lieutenant general. General O’Neill’s appointment had to be approved by the Senate.
September 1, 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the results of the Bottom-Up Review which laid out America’s national security plans for the five year period between FY95 to FY99. Where the ballistic missile defense program was concerned, primary emphasis was to be placed on Theater Missile Defense, which was to receive $12 billion. National Missile Defense was to receive $3 billion, with the remaining $3 billion split between Follow-On Technology and Research and Support.
September 27-October 1, 1993 The fourth ABM Treaty Review Conference reaffirms the parties’ “commitment to the ABM Treaty” and the importance of “maintaining the viability of the treaty in view of political and technological changes.” The review also discusses the issue of state succession to the agreement in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
November 19, 1993 The U.S. Senate confirmed Major General Malcolm R. O’Neill for the position of Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, and approved his promotion to lieutenant general. O’Neill was promoted on 22 November during a ceremony in the offices of BMDO.
November 30, 1993 The Army carried out a successful test of the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The ERINT collided with the warhead of a STORM target vehicle. This warhead contained a cluster of 38 pressurized, water-filled containers designed to simulate toxic chemical submunitions.
November 29-October 3, 1993 The United States presents a proposed ABM Treaty “clarification” to establish guidelines for deployment of theater missile defense systems, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.
The United States proposes to define a TMD interceptor as one with a demonstrated capability to intercept a ballistic missile whose reentry vehicle velocity does not exceed 5 kilometers/second, roughly the reentry speed of a warhead on a 3,500-kilometer range missile.
The Clinton administration also formally withdraws the revisions to the ABM Treaty put forward by the Bush administration in September 1992 and agrees to multilateralize the treaty.
January 24-February 4, 1994 Russia proposes that, in addition to placing limits on the speed of target vehicles, TMD interceptors themselves be limited to a velocity of 3 kilometers/second. This speed limit would permit deployment of the U.S. Army ground-based Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and Navy lower-tier defenses, but would not permit the deployment of higher-speed systems such as the Navy upper-tier or the Air Force air-launched boost-phase intercept system. The United States rejects the proposal.
February 11, 1994 The Army System Acquisition Review Council selected the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) over the Patriot multi-mode missile to be the missile in the PAC-3 theater missile defense program.
February 15, 1994 An Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) hit a ballistic missile target vehicle in a test conducted at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The target was a nose cone carrying a simulated chemical warhead.
May 11, 1994 A Scud missile struck the North Yemen city of Sanaa at 1 a.m. today causing fifty-three casualties. As many as twenty-five of these people may have died.
July 11-13, 1994 In high-level talks with Russia on ABM Treaty clarification, the United States proposes a speed limit of 3 kilometers/second for land-based interceptors, 4.5 kilometers/second for sea-based interceptors, and 5.5 kilometers/second for air- based interceptors.
August 1994 Russia accepts a 3-kilometer/second speed limit for TMD interceptors in all basing modes, but seeks to restrict higher-speed TMD interceptors to the test phase. Deployment of higher-speed TMD interceptors would be subject to further negotiation.
September 27, 1994 In their “Contract With America” pre-congressional election platform, 350 Republican candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives pledge to deploy both ABM and TMD systems.
September 28, 1994 At a summit meeting in Washington, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issue a joint statement noting that they have “agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.” The two presidents also note that “[b]oth sides have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The presidents agreed that the two sides will conduct a joint exercise of theater missile defenses and early warning. This exercise would contribute to providing a basis for U.S. and Russian forces to operate together, for example, in peacekeeping operations.”
October 10, 1994 Russia proposes to defer discussions on testing or deployment of TMD systems with interceptor velocities above 3 kilometers/second.
February 15, 1995 The House narrowly defeats the portion of the Republican “Contract with America” that would require deploying a nation-wide missile defense “as soon as practical.”
April 12, 1995 A U.S. Department of Defense ABM Treaty compliance report to Congress concludes that, because the system “does not have capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles” and assuming it will not be “tested in an ABM mode,” deployment of the Navy’s upper-tier missile defense system would be permitted under the ABM Treaty.
April 21, 1995 The first flight test of the U.S. Army THAAD TMD interceptor takes place at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
May 9-10, 1995 At a summit meeting in Moscow, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin endorse a set of principles for negotiations on TMD. They agree that “theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.” These agreed principles mean that the ABM Treaty “does not apply to theater missile defense systems that may simply have a theoretical capability against some strategic missiles but which would not be militarily significant in the context of operational considerations.” In addition, the two presidents agree that “theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other,” and that “the scale of deployment — in number and geographic scope — of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater missile defense programs confronting that side.” The two presidents “under[take] to promote reciprocal openness in activities of the sides in theater missile defense systems and in the exchange of corresponding information” and “confirmed the interests of the sides in the development and fielding of effective TMD systems on a cooperative basis.”
November 1995 A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 95-19) judges that “No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.”
November 17, 1995 The United States and Russia agree on a framework for negotiating a demarcation line between ABM and TMD systems:
“Ballistic target missiles, against which theater missile defenses (TMD) systems are tested, will have a maximum range of no more than 3,500 kilometers and a maximum flight velocity of no more than 5 kilometers/second. “All TMD systems with a demonstrated interceptor velocity of 3 kilometers/second or less and tested as above are compliant with the ABM Treaty. “The sides will implement, on a reciprocal basis,” a series of “confidence-building measures regarding TMD systems and components…” to include reciprocal exchanges of information and notification of tests. The United States makes clear that, “with respect to those TMD systems with higher velocity interceptors, the status quo continues, which is to say that the United States will make compliance determinations based on the relevant provisions of the ABM Treaty.”
February 10, 1996 Program Budget Decision 224 was issued. This PBD reflected the results of a general OSD review of the BMD program. It called for a reduction of about $2.4 billion in the FYDP for missile defenses with the bulk of the cuts ($2 billion) coming in the program for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system.
March 6, 1996 The Clinton administration announces a reoriented missile defense program that emphasizes those TMD systems intended to counter the existing short-range missile threat and defers deployment decisions on the most advanced TMD systems (THAAD and the Navy upper-tier) until after the year 2000.
The administration also announces its plan to begin a national missile defense (NMD) “3-plus-3” program. This calls for the development over the next three years of the basic elements of an NMD that could be deployed in three more years if a threat emerges that would justify such a decision.
March 1996 The “Defend America Act,” which declares as U.S. policy that the nation will deploy a limited missile defense by 2003, is introduced in both Houses of Congress, but it does not come to a vote because of the estimated cost of deployment.
April 1996 The Clinton Administration’s “3 + 3” national missile defense plan-three years for development and, if warranted, three more years to deploy a system-is established. The Pentagon changes the purpose of NMD from a “technology” readiness program to a “deployment” readiness program.
April 9, 1996 Dr. Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, directed the BMDO Director to establish a Joint Program Office to manage the deployment readiness program for national missile defense.
April 21, 1996 At the Moscow G-7 meeting and bilateral summit, President Clinton announces “important progress” on the TMD demarcation issue. Negotiations in the Standing Consultative Committee (ABM Treaty) will resume in May with the aim of completing by June a first-phase demarcation agreement pertaining to systems with interceptor speeds up to 3 kilometers/second. A follow-on agreement on higher-speed systems is to be concluded by October.
May 31, 1996 LTG Malcolm R. O’Neill, BMDO Director, retired after thirty-four years of military service.
June 24, 1996 The United States and Russia conclude “an initial agreement distinguishing between defenses against strategic ballistic missiles [ABM systems]…and certain defenses against non-strategic ballistic missiles, i.e., so-called ‘lower-velocity’ theater missile defenses (TMD). This agreement will make clear that all TMD systems with interceptor velocities up to and including 3 kilometers/second are permitted under the ABM Treaty, so long as they are not tested against target missiles with velocities above 5 kilometers/second or ranges greater than 3,500 kilometers. The sides will continue discussions on demarcation of higher-velocity TMD systems.”
June 26, 1996 Secretary of Defense William Perry announced that Lt. Gen. Lester G. Lyles, USAF, had been nominated to the Senate for the position of Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. At the time of his nomination, General Lyles was serving as Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command’s Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base, California. The General’s appointment was confirmed by the Senate on 2 August.
August 20, 1996 The Israelis completed a successful test of the Arrow II (Hetz-2) anti-ballistic missile. During this test the Arrow II missile destroyed a target missile that was an Arrow I, modified so that its radar cross section and warhead matched that of a Scud missile. The target missile was launched from a barge in the Mediterranean Sea about four minutes before the launching of the Arrow II missile from an Israeli air force base on the coast of Israel about ten kilometers away. Israel’s Green Pine fire control radar participated in this test and was apparently able to track the target missile.
September 23, 1996 At a bilateral meeting in New York between U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, the two issue a statement in which they reaffirm their commitment to the preliminary phase-one “demarcation” agreement on lower-velocity TMD systems. The two further announce agreement that the SCC will reconvene October 7 in order to get phase- one documents ready for signature and begin the phase-two negotiations on higher-velocity TMD systems.
October 31, 1996 A signing ceremony scheduled to take place between U.S. Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov for the already completed “first-phase” demarcation agreement pertaining to lower-velocity TMD systems is cancelled at the last minute, with both sides blaming the other for the delay. Russia refuses to sign and allow entry into force of the first-phase agreement without a second-phase agreement on more capable systems. The United States refuses to link the two agreements and cancels the signing.
December 1996 A congressionally chartered panel headed by former CIA Director Robert Gates concurs with the time lines estimated in the 1995 NIE.
December 3, 1996 The Defense Department hosted a special briefing for the press to discuss the finding that data gathered by SDIO’s Clementine space experiment indicated the presence of a substantial amount of ice in the north polar region of the moon.
January 21, 1997 U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and 25 co-sponsors introduce the “National Missile Defense Act of 1997,” requiring the United States to deploy a national missile defense system by the end of the year 2003; this differs from the Clinton administration’s “3-plus-3” program, which requires the United States to develop an NMD system by 2000, at which point all ballistic missile threats to the United States will be evaluated and a determination will be made as to whether or not such a system should be deployed by 2003. On the same day, Senator Richard Lugar introduces the “Defend the United States of America Act of 1997,” which requires the United States to develop an NMD system capable of being deployed by the end of 2003 with a congressional vote in 2000 to determine whether or not to deploy such a system.
January 24, 1997 A modified Standard Missile 2 Block IVA successfully intercepted and destroyed a Lance missile target at the White Sands Missile Range. This was the first successful intercept of a missile by the SM2. During the test, the interceptor successfully transitioned from radar guidance to its infrared guidance system prior to destroying the target with its blast fragmentation warhead. This successful test was one of the prerequisites for moving the Navy’s Theater Wide missile defense system into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development stage of the defense acquisition process.
February 7, 1997 BMDO and the U.S. Army’s Space and Strategic Defense Command carried out a test in which a Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile successfully intercepted a theater ballistic target missile. The target missile was fired from Bigen Island, Aur Atoll, toward the Kwajalein Atoll; the interceptor missile was fired from Meck Island in the Kwajalein Atoll and intercepted the target missile over the Pacific Ocean. A Patriot Guidance-Enhanced Missile was also fired at the target, but destroyed itself because the PAC-2 missile had already destroyed the target missile. The target missile had the characteristics of a variant of the Scud missile.
March 21, 1997 At the Helsinki Summit, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin issue a Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in which they:
Reaffirm the principles of the May 10, 1995, Presidential Joint Statement. Reaffirm agreement on phase one of the ABM/TMD Demarcation agreement achieved at the SCC. Articulate the four elements that will make up phase two of the ABM/TMD Demarcation agreement: Limitation of the velocity of ballistic target missiles to 5 kilometers/second; Limitation of the flight range of ballistic missile target missiles to 3,500 kilometers; No development, testing, or deployment of space-based TMD interceptors or components based on alternative technologies that could substitute for space- based TMD interceptors; Annual exchange of detailed information on TMD plans and programs. The accord also includes a series of “no plan” statements/commitment and agreement that “any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities,” including matters that fall under phase two of the ABM/TMD Demarcation agreement, are to be raised and dealt with at the SCC.
April 1, 1997 BMDO established the Joint Program Office for the National Missile Defense program after submitting to Congress the cost-benefit analysis report that was required by the FY 1997 Defense Appropriations Conference Report. The JPO was to be responsible for “the design, development and demonstration of an NMD system to defend the United States from ballistic missile attack by 2003.” After a 1999 system demonstration, the JPO was to be in a position to deploy a national missile defense system if the threat warranted such a deployment.
June 24, 1997 BMDO’s Joint Program Office, in conjunction with the U.S. Army’s National Missile Defense Program Office and the Air Force’s 30th Space Wing, successfully completed the first flight test (IFT-1A) of “a candidate infrared sensor designed for possible use with the National Missile Defense (NMD) program.” This sensor was produced by Boeing North America and employed a very “sensitive infrared silicon-based focal plane arrray.” Another sensor developed by Hughes Aircraft will be tested later. In the test of 24 June, a specially configured Minuteman II rocket, fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, lifted aloft a suite of test targets. This launch occurred twenty-one minutes before a payload launch vehicle sent the Boeing sensor package into space from Kwajalein Missile Range in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The sensor package then flew by and “looked at” the test objects, collecting an extensive amount of data on the objects. Following the test of the Huges sensor package that will occur later, both companies will integrate their sensors with hardware to develop a test exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKV). These two EKVs will then be flown in actual intercept tests. Following these intercept tests, one of the EKV designs will be selected for an integrated NMD flight test in late 1999.
June 24, 1997 First fly-by test of the Boeing/TRW exoatmospheric kill vehicle for the NMD system. A lawsuit filed by a former TRW employee alleges that TRW misled defense officials about the results of the test.
August 6, 1997 George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, informed Secretary of Defense William Cohen that in accordance with Section 1321 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997, he was appointing nine individuals to serve on the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. The nine appointees were: Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (chairman); Mr. Barry Blechman; General George Lee Butler, USAF (Ret.); Dr. Richard Garwin; Mr. William Schneider, Jr.; former Senator Malcolm Wallop; General Lawrence Welch, USAF (Ret.); Dr. Paul Wolfowitz; and former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey.
August 11, 1997 Following a 6 August meeting of the Defense Acquisition Board, Mr. Noel Longuemare, acting USDA&T, approved BMDO’s NMD acquisition strategy and the release of a request for proposals for the next phase of the Lead System Integrator contract.
August 19, 1997 The fifth flight of the Arrow 2 anti-tactical ballistic missile was launched at 11:29 a.m. local time (4:29 EDT). The lift-off was normal, but the interceptor veered off course soon after launch and had to be destroyed for range safety purposes. The target missile was an Arrow 1 missile. The cause of the failure was isolated to the Electrical Actuator Driver (EAD). The EADs used in the test missiles were prototype models that had not heretofore been subjected to subsystem testing.
August 21, 1997 The Standing Consultative Commission concluded its fifty-fifth session. During this session, Russia and the United States reached agreement on TMD-NMD demarcation and on the matter of succession to the ABM Treaty. The agreements were to be submitted to the governments of the countries involved in the negotiations. After final approval, the agreements were to be signed sometime during the fall.
September 25, 1997 The Task Force on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs met for the first time. This committee was being cosponsored by DTSE&E, BMDO, and DOT&E to examine steps that could be taken in engineering, ground test, and simulation to maximize the probability that each flight on the various BMDO interceptor programs would be successful. This measure was undertaken in recognition that the BMD program, particularly the NMD, was ambitious and high-risk due to tight budgets, demanding schedules, and reliance on hit-to-kill technology. The task force was chaired by General Larry Welch (USAF, Ret.).
September 26, 1997 The Navy conducted a risk reduction missile flight test at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Kauai, HI, using a modified SM-2 Block IV. The flight was declared a “NO TEST” because the missile did not complete second stage flight and the proper operation of the SM-2 Block IV second stage was not the focus of this test. The primary objective was to demonstrate missile flight stability during second/third stage separation and subsequent flight to extremely high altitude. The missile did not enter the upper atmosphere as required to permit achieving the conditions that were prerequisite for the primary test objective. BMDO would later challenge the Navy’s decision to declare this “no test” rather than a failure.
September 26, 1997 In a ceremony at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York, representatives of the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Unkraine signed agreements that aimed to establish a demarcation between TMD systems not restricted by the ABM Treaty of 1972 and national missile defense systems that were covered by the treaty. These delegates also signed a memorandum of understanding that named Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as successor states to the ABM Treaty, replacing the defunct Soviet Union.
September 29, 1997 The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Army successfully demonstrated the first Developmental Test Flight (DT-1) of a PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile at White Sands Missile Range, N.M. Preliminary data indicate the test was successful. Test objectives included the verification of launch and flight functions, interfaces with the existing Patriot System, and missile operation in flight environments prior to targets intercept missions. No intercept of a target was attempted in this test.
October 1, 1997 The U.S. Army established its Space and Missile Defense Command, which was to be the Army’s component for space and national missile defense. This new command was also to serve as the material developer for various programs and the Army’s integrator for theater missile defense. Its purpose was to assure that the Army’s forces had “‘access to space assets and the products they provide to win decisively with minimum casualties, and effective missile defense to protect the nation as well as deployed U.S. forces and those of its allies.’”
October 9, 1997 Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) issued a “Dear Colleagues” letter in which he noted that “now is the time to respond to [the] emerging Iranian missile threat.” He had already solicited possible responses to the threat. Among the possible initiatives were the following: secure added radar systems to expand the footprint of existing U.S. and Israeli systems, contingency deployments of THAAD systems after it had carried out a successful intercept, acceleration of the Navy Theater Wide system, etc.
October 17, 1997 The U.S. Army test-fired the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) at an old Air Force satellite. The laser fired two bursts at the satellite, one for less than a second and a second one for about ten seconds. Neither the satellite’s laser camera that was the target of the firing, nor the satellite was damaged in the test.
October 20, 1997 Ambassador David Smith, one-time U.S. ambassador to the Defense and Space Talks (1989-1992) criticized the recent agreements reached by the Clinton administration through the Standing Consultative Committee talks over the past several years. According to Smith, in spite of the “bold claims” being made for the agreements, if ratified, they would only “further calcify Cold War thinking and obstruct U.S. theater missile defense.” Among Smith’s complaints were the outright proscription of space-based lasers by these agreements and the freezing of U.S. theater missile defense systems that the level of 1997 technology.
October 28, 1997 Responding to widespread reports of Iran’s imminent fielding of mid-range ballistic missiles, Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) and a bipartisan group of legislators announced their intention to introduce a bill authorizing $390 million in funding toward a crash effort to accelerate U.S. theater missile defense programs. Known as the Iran Missile Protection Act of 1997 (IMPACT 97), this legislation attempted to respond to the short-term threat by authorizing more funds for the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), the THAAD system, Navy Theater Wide, and the Israeli Arrow program.
October 31, 1997 DOD and the Canadian Ministry of Defense signed a statement of intent (SOI) on defense space cooperation. Preparations then got underway for the first bilateral meetings scheduled for late November.
December 15, 1997 At approximately 11:15 EST, the second PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 controlled test flight took place. After clearing the launch tube, the missile executed a pull up maneuver using fourteen attitude control motors. The missile reached an altitude in excess of fifteen kilometers before pitching over to fly down range. Ninety-seven seconds into flight, the launch crew commanded the remaining attitude control motors and flight termination system to function. All indications are the missile flight was nominal. The Radio Data Frequency Link (RFDL), one of the items which did not function on the first controlled test flight, did transmit and receive data.
January 1998 The Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs released a majority report that essentially accused the Clinton administration of being asleep at the switch were preventing the proliferation of missile technology, weapons of mass destruction, and key enabling technologies. As the report put the matter: “The Clinton Administration’s nonproliferation efforts have been inadequate. . . . The Clinton Administration has not been willing to take the tough actions necessary to backup the rhetoric in executive orders and other statements. And, by relaxing dual-use export controls the Administration has allowed the United States to join the ranks of the proliferators.” Given the difficulties of containing proliferation, the U.S. must take other measures to protect itself against proliferation, to include deploying national missile defenses.
January 14, 1998 The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States began its work. The commission was established under the authority of the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, which stipulated that the commission must complete its work within six months. Chaired by Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, the panel also included the following members: Mr. Barry Blechman, Dr. William Graham, General Lee Butler (USAF, Ret.), General Larry Welch (USAF, Ret.), Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, Mr. James Woolsey, Dr. William Schneider, and Dr. Richard Garwin. Dr. Steve Cambone was appointed staff director of the small staff assembled to support the commission.
January 15, 1998 The National Missile Defense (NMD) Integrated Test Flight-2 (IFT-2) was carried out successfully. All NMD Integrated Flight Test Objectives, as specified in the IFT-2 Detailed Test Plan, were completed. Test data was collected at all nodes of the NMD System for later analysis.
January 21, 1998 Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, advised President Bill Clinton that his committee would not consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) until the Clinton Administration submits for approval the agreements on TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Convention on Climate Change.
February 1998 In the first of what will be annual reviews, the Welch panel criticizes shortcomings and overambitious time lines that amount to a “rush to failure” in various missile defense programs.
February 27, 1998 An independent panel chaired by retired General Larry Welch issues its report on the Pentagon’s missile defense testing programs. The panel says that the ambitious programs amount to a “rush to failure.” The report’s authors, which include several defense experts, urge a longer development period for missile defense weapons.
March 19, 1998 Senator Thad Cochrane (R-MS) introduced the American Missile Protection Act on behalf of himself and the bill’s co-sponsor, Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI). Senate Bill 1806, as the Cochrane-Inouye bill was designated, included a section that recited the modern threat to the U.S. from ballistic missiles, noting that “several adversaries of the United States have stated their intention to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United States.”
April 1998 Integrated Ground Test 1A. Primary objectives are testing system discrimination and ability to handle unsophisticated Capability-1 threats.
April 6, 1998 Pakistan tested its Ghauri missile, which reported has a range of 950 miles and can carry a nuclear warhead of more than 1500 pounds. The missile was named after a medieval Afghan king who defeated the Hindu ruler of New Delhi. The capabilities of this missile, as well as the symbolism of its name, were considered to be highly provocative by the Indian government.
April 14, 1998 The Kraken cruise missile built by the BMDO Countermeasures Hands-On Project crashed on take off from Point Mugu, California. The Kraken was built to test the ability of a rest-of-world country to develop this type of weapon.
April 17, 1998 The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) announced the successful launch of its Red Crow Flight Experiment. The purpose of the Red Crow Flight Experiment was to assess the operational performance of a suite of ballistic missile countermeasures under real atmospheric flight conditions. Preliminary flight data indicated that the Red Crow mission objectives were met. The Red Crow launch took place from the Kauai Test Facility, Barking Sands, Hawaii, at approximately 1:05 PM EST.
April 20, 1998 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced that the Clinton Administration will fund a third Arrow battery for Israel in response to the rising threat posed by intermediate ranged Iranian missiles. The Israelis had asked for the support back in March. The estimated cost of this initiative was $170 million. Secretary Cohen was in Israel when he made the announcement.
April 30, 1998 OSD announced that BMDO had awarded the LSI contract to Boeing North America of Seattle, Washington. The contract was for a $1.6 billion development program that was to last for three years, with a possible follow-on development program covering up to seven more years.
May 12, 1998 THAAD Flight Test 08 was conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, this morning at 0522 Mountain Standard Time. The test was a failure. Preliminary investigation indicated that the THAAD missile lost control shortly after launch. The missile impacted on the White Sands Missile Range about 2 miles north of the launch site. The cause of the failure was later determined to be an electronic short affecting the missile’s thrust-vector control system. This was the fifth straight failure to intercept for THAAD. The fourth failure earlier had triggered major concern about the program. The failure on 12 May set off an intense re-evaluation of the program and prompted major program revisions, including an agreement with Lockheed-Martin whereby the company would pay the government as much as a total of $75 million in case of later failures in the test program.
May 13, 1998 The attempt to debate the “American Missile Protection Act” is defeated by a single vote in the Senate.
June 24, 1998 The Defense Consultative Group (Arms Control and Strategic Issues) met at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. This session was co-chaired by Dr. Susan Koch, deputy assistant secretary of defense (Threat Reduction Policy) and General-Major Lukin of the Russian MOD. One of the main U.S. goals for this meeting was to open another channel for dialogue on national missile defense. In this vein, a briefing on the NMD program was given.
June 29-30, 1998 Alaskan state and federal lawmakers, along with economic and security experts met in Alaska to discuss “AlaskaÕs Assets and Security.” This effort was part of a “concerted, statewide effort that began in spring 1997 to educate Alaskans on the threat of ballistic missiles and, more importantly, to pressure the U.S. government to guarantee Alaska effective protection against ballistic missile attack on an equal basis with the 48 contiguous states.”
July 15, 1998 The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Rumsfeld Commission) submitted its report to Congress. The nine commissioners who made up the Rumsfeld panel were unanimous in their conclusions, which included the following:
“Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies. These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which we are not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions. The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations’ capabilities will not match those of U.S. systems for accuracy or reliability. However, they would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made.”
July 20, 1998 Trade publications reported that Rear Admiral George Huchting, the Navy’s program executive officer for theater air defense-surface combatants, had decided to keep USS Hue City (CG-66) and Vicksburg (CG-69) from rejoining the fleet for up to a year until interoperability problems between their Aegis combat systems and newly-installed Cooperative Engagement Capability systems were resolved. Successive improvements of the combat systems aboard the two ships had vastly increased their capabilities, but had steadily complicated integration problems as older systems tried to communicate with many newer ones.
July 21, 1998 Iran carried out the first flight test of its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which was expected to have a range of 800 to 900 miles, sufficiently great to strike virtually any country in the Middle East, including Israel.
July 27, 1998 The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and the U.S. Army announced that a contractual agreement had been reached between the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system Prime Contractor, Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space (LMMS), and the Government concerning incentives to improve missile performance. The agreement called for cost-sharing of up to $75 million if LMMS failed to achieve three body-to-body hits over the remainder of the Program Definition & Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the THAAD contract. Five test flights remained in the PDRR test program.
July 27, 1998 The Defense Department announced the selection of the booster for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Ground-based Interceptor (GBI). Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Defense Acquisition Executive, selected a booster that incorporated commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) stages. The other booster considered was the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The COTS booster was to be assembled by the Boeing Corporation, the lead system integrator contractor for the NMD program.
August 31, 1998 North Korea flight tested its Taepo Dong-1 missile in a flight that carried over Japan. According to the Washington Times, the missile traveled about 1000 miles, surpassing by 380 miles the range of the No-Dong medium ranged missile. This launch caused an angry reaction in Japan, which immediately canceled plans to extend $1 billion in aid that was to help North Korea build “two civilian reactors.” It also caused a furor in the U.S. government over the next two weeks as its implications for the U.S. threat were teased out.
September 9, 1998 In the aftermath of the North Korean launch, Senate Republicans again try to begin debate on the “American Missile Protection Act” but again fail by one vote.
September 14, 1998 The Israelis successfully completed a non-intercept full integration flight test of the Arrow II missile system. In this test, a Radar Environment Simulator generated an electronic threat and threat trajectory that was fed to the Green Pine fire control radar, which “tracked” this data and passed information to the Citron Tree command and control system. Data from Citron Tree were then passed to the Hazelnut Tree Launch Control Center and launcher, launching the missile. Up-date information from Citron Tree was passed to the missile via an up-link between Green Pine and the Arrow missile.
January 20, 1999 The Pentagon requests more money for NMD programs, delays the target date for achieving initial operating capability from 2003 to a “more realistic” 2005, and sets a June 2000 date for a deployment decision by the Administration.
February 5, 1999 Citing technical snafus and cost overruns, the Air Force canceled its contracts with TRW Inc. and Boeing Co. to design and develop the prototype satellites for SBIRS-low.
February 10, 1999 The National Missile Defense program conducted Risk Reduction Flight 5, which was designed to reduce the technical risks inherent in the National Missile Defense (NMD) Integrated Flight Test 3 scheduled for June. Risk Reduction Flight 5 demonstrated real time element hardware and software capabilities and system interfaces. The functions exercised included communications links, system loading and timing, algorithms, cueing, and tracking. The flight also provided the National Missile Defense Test Team with training and a rehearsal for NMD Integrated Flight Tests 3. Risk Reduction Flight 6 was scheduled for May 12.
February 21-27, 1999 During this week, a U.S. delegation composed of Robert Bell (special assistant to the president for arms control), Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and John Holum (Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs) traveled to Moscow for preliminary talks on modifying the ABM Treaty. The Russians essentially stonewalled the American delegation, continuing to insist on no changes to the treaty.
February 25, 1999 In a letter to the President, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked the President to provide evidence to contradict the contention of Republicans that the 1972 ABM Treaty is moribund. Without this evidence, Helms said, his committee would hold hearings in the near future in which the operating “‘legal assumption’” would be that the treaty is “‘no longer in force.’” Accompanying his letter was a memorandum prepared by attorneys George Miron and Douglas Feith for the Washington-based Center for Security Policy, which states that the ABM Treaty died with the demise of the Soviet Union.
March 15, 1999 BMDO and the U.S. Army conducted the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile Seeker Characterization Flight (SCF) test at White Sands Missile Range, NM, today at 6:55 a.m. MST. Preliminary data indicated that the test was successful. The objectives of the test included collecting data and analyzing the system/missile capability to detect, track, and close with its target, gathering data on the PAC-3 missile seeker in a flight environment, and evaluating performance closed-loop homing guidance in flight. While interception was not a specific objective of the SCF, the PAC-3 missile did intercept the Hera target missile.
March 16, 1999 The Senate voted 97 to 3 “to commit the United States to deploy a national anti-missile defense system after President Clinton and most Democrats dropped their long-standing opposition to the measure in return for a renewed commitment to arms control. The measure called for the U.S. to deploy national missile defenses “‘as soon as technologically possible.’”
March 17, 1999 By a vote of 317 to 105, the House of Representatives approved a measure committing the U.S. to deploy national missile defenses.
March 29, 1999 In a flight test at White Sands Missile Range, THAAD failed to hit its target for the sixth straight time.
March 31, 1999 The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ceased to exist at midnight. As directed by Congress, ACDA was absorbed by the State Department when its former responsibilities were assumed by the under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, who also served as senior arms control adviser to the president and to the secretary of state. The new under secretary was supported by four bureaus: the non-proliferation bureau, an arms control bureau, a political/military affairs bureau, and the verification and compliance bureau.
April 1, 1999 Boeing and the National Missile Defense Joint Program Office broke ground at Boeing’s Jetplex facility in Huntsville, AL, to begin construction of a prototype silo to be used for NMD weapon system testing and development exercises. This silo was part of a larger facility, estimated to cost $2.6 million, that Boeing was building at the Jetplex facility. This larger facility was known as the Ground-Based Interceptor Development Integration Laboratory (GDIL) and would include a simulated missile control room.
April 11, 1999 India successfully tested its Agni II missile.
April 14, 1999 Pakistan carried out another test of its Ghauri II missile just three days after the Indians conducted a test of their Agni II missile. The Ghauri II is reportedly the longest ranged missile in the Pakistani arsenal. It can hurl a 2,200 pound payload 1,240 miles.
April 15, 1999 Pakistan test fired its 450-mile Shaheen missile.
May 4, 1999 A Navy Theater Wide Block I Program Acquisition Decision Memorandum was signed by Dr. Jacques Gansler. It baselined NTW to a Block I FUE in FY2007.
May 5, 1999 The Israelis successfully tested their Black Sparrow air launched target vehicle, which was designed for use in the Arrow program.
May 11, 1999 The Senate confirmed the appointment of Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish as third director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
May 20, 1999 By a vote of 345 to 71, the House approved legislation stating that it was the policy of the United States to field limited national missile defenses as soon as technically feasible. The bill also said that the U.S. should continue arms control talks with the Russians.
May 25, 1999 A test of the THAAD missile was aborted when the Hera target missile failed to follow the appropriate trajectory. This test was to have been the tenth in a series of thirteen flight tests currently planned in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase of the THAAD system.
May 27, 1999 Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles was promoted to General as he assumed his new duties as Vice Chief of Staff United States Air Force.
June 3, 1999 Russia conducted another successful test of its Topol M missile. Fired from Plesetsk cosmodrome, the missile hit a target 5,500 miles away in Kamchatka. This was the seventh test in three years for Topol, which NATO designates the SS-27. The maximum range of this three-stage, solid-propellant ICBM is 11,000 kilometers. It is 22.7 meters long, has a maximum diameter of 1.86 meters, and weighs 47.2 tons at launch.
June 10, 1999 THAAD successfully intercepted a Hera target missile at White Sands Missile Range. This test ended a string of six failures.
June 14, 1999 Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, United States Air Force, assumed his duties as Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, becoming the agency’s third director.
June 20, 1999 The U.S. and Russia issued a joint statement following discussions between U.S. President William Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The statement began by noting that the ABM Treaty was fundamental to “strengthening strategic stability” and reducing strategic offensive arms. “Proceeding from the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and from the need to maintain the strategic balance between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty, which is a cornerstone of strategic stability, and to continuing efforts to strengthen the Treaty, to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future.”
July 19, 1999 By a vote of 381-0 the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling upon American leaders to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall by promoting an educational effort on the Cold War and honoring U.S. veterans of the conflict. According to a newspaper report on the House vote, the Pentagon fixed the dates of the Cold War as stretching from 2 September 1945, when Japan surrendered at the end of World War II, to 26 December 1991 when Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president and the Soviet Union was disbanded.
July 22, 1999 The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-38) was signed into law. This law states, “It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.” The Administration’s program on missile defense is fully consistent with this policy.
July 23, 1999 President Clinton signs the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, but lists four criteria he will use to make an ultimate deployment decision: threat, cost, technological status of NMD, and adherence to a renegotiated ABM Treaty.
August 2, 1999 The 11th flight test for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) defense missile system was completed successfully, when the THAAD interceptor struck a Hera target missile at approximately 7:45 a.m. EDT at the White Sands Missile Range, N.M. For the first time in FT-11, THAAD intercepted a target outside the earth’s atmosphere. This was also the missile’s first intercept of a warhead that had separated from its booster. The difficulty of the test was further increased because cooling of the target in outer space reduced the ability of the missile’s infrared sensors to detect it.
August 16, 1999 The Memorandum of Understanding with the Japanese Defense Agency concerning Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Research became effective with an exchange of diplomatic notes.
August 17, 1999 The United States and Russia resumed strategic arms talks that included both further restrictions on offensive arms and a modification of the ABM Treaty to allow the United States to deploy a limited national missile defense system.
September 1999 The Welch panel’s second look at the reconfigured timelines for NMD again concludes that the program is “high risk” and recommends that the President’s June 2000 decision be considered a “feasibility” rather than a “readiness to deploy” judgment. A new NIE, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,” judges that “during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq.”
September 16, 1999 The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Army today conducted a successful intercept test of the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile at the White Sands Missile Range, N.M. this morning at 7:26 a.m. Mountain Time. Test objectives included a body-to-body intercept of a threat representative of a tactical ballistic missile target; a demonstrated capability of the ground system and missile to detect, track, and engage the target, and to collect data to evaluate missile homing functions.
October 2, 1999 BMDO and the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command successfully carried out the IFT-3 NMD test. At 7:02 p.m. PDT, a modified Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target vehicle was launched from Vandenberg AFB, California; and a prototype NMD interceptor was launched approximately 20 minutes later and 4,300 miles away from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The intercept occurred at approximately 7:32 p.m. PDT and demonstrated the ability of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle to intercept and destroy a ballistic missile target outside the atmosphere. The intercept vehicle weighed about 120 pounds and was equipped with two infrared sensors, a visible sensor, and a small propulsion system. The interceptor’s seeker system located and tracked the target and then guided the kill vehicle to a body-to-body impact with the target. The test demonstrated the power of a “hit to kill” interceptor to totally destroy and neutralize a warhead carrying a weapon of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical or biological.
October 26, 1999 Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, USD (A&T) issued an acquisition decision memorandum authorizing the PAC-3 program to begin low-rate initial production.
November 1, 1999 The Arrow II missile system successfully completed its first fully integrated intercept test. This was the seventh flight and third intercept for the Arrow 2. During the test, the Arrow took off and flew in a nominal trajectory, acquired the TM-91 target, then locked on and homed in on the target missile. The Green Pine fire control radar and the Citron Tree battle management center both participated fully in the test, performing battle planning, launch operation, up link/down link message applications, as well as post intercept verifications.
November 15, 1999 Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, accepted the 15 September recommendation of the JROC that the Army be designed lead service for the land-based NMD system.
December 6, 1999 Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, BMDO Director, instituted the most wide-reaching reorganization of the agency since the reorganization of SDIO that followed the negotiation of the 1992 GPALS General Manager memorandum of understanding with the three major services. The new organization was flat, with a large number of agencies reporting directly to the Director’s group to improve communications and increase the speed of decisions. The four tiers in this new arrangement were the Director’s group where decisions were made, the support area (General Counsel, Chief Information Office, etc.), the core mission functions tier, and the execution tier (PEOs and the NMD Joint Program Office). Additionally, there was a constellation of seven (the original constellation contained six, but on 7 December General Kadish added a seventh to produce an integrated radar plan for the agency) semi-permanent program support teams. This constellation was expected to change as the BMDO mission evolved over time.
January 18, 2000 During NMD’s IFT-4 flight test, the interceptor failed to hit its target. The entire mission was virtually flawless, with the malfunction developing during the end game. A blockage in the kill vehicle’s krypton cooler caused a sensor failure in the final six seconds of the flight. As a result, the interceptor missed its target by 73 meters.
February 5, 2000 A PAC-3 missile successfully intercepted its Hera target over the deserts at White Sands Missile Range. The Hera had been launched from Fort Wingate about five minutes before the launching of the Patriot.
February 14, 2000 Philip Coyle, Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, tells Congress that “undue pressure has been placed on the [NMD] program” by the requirement to meet the artificial deployment deadline of 2005.
March 14, 2000 The Israelis held a symbolic ceremony in which an Arrow II missile was rolled out of its production facility and accepted by the Israeli Air Force.
March 15, 2000 The Army completed flight test MFT-3B at White Sands Missile Test Range. In this test, a PAC-2 production missile was fired from a PAC-3 launcher and “successfully engaged” a target that was towed behind a MQM-107 drone. The purpose of this test was to “demonstrate the ability to launch a standard Patriot missile from a PAC-3 launcher and collect reliability data on the production missile round.”
April 14, 2000 The lower chamber of the Russian Parliament ratified the START II treaty by a vote of 228 to 131. This treaty had been agreed to by negotiators of the two countries in 1993 and passed by the U.S. Senate in 1996. On the occasion of the Duma’s action, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin told the Russian Parliament that if the U.S. that Russia would withdraw from all arms control agreements if the U.S. forced changes to the ABM Treaty. In his words: “‘I want to stress that, in this case, we will have the chance and we will withdraw not only from the Start II treaty, but from the whole system of treaties on the limitation and control of strategic and conventional weapons.’”
June 13, 2000 The third Welch panel report states that the “technological capability to develop and field” a limited NMD system to handle “the defined threat” is available but that meeting the 2005 target date for IOC “remains high risk.” The panel also points out that flight tests encompass only “a limited part of the required operating envelope.”
July 7, 2000 The third Integrated Flight intercept (IFT 5), delayed twice from the original April test date, fails. The EKV does not separate from the surrogate booster and therefore does not activate its sensors. Additionally, the Mylar decoy on the target rocket fails to inflate.
August 2000 A new NIE on the emerging ICBM threat to the U.S. is completed and sent to the President.
September 1, 2000 President Clinton decides to not authorize work to begin on deploying NMD.
September 27, 2000 Risk Reduction Flights 9 and 10 are declared successes by the Pentagon. RRF 9 tested the discrimination capabilities of the Ground Based Radar prototype against 20 objects while RRF-10 “exercised” all NMD system target, tracking, and communications elements except those of the GBI.
January 2000 With IFT 5 a failure, the Pentagon projects it may not be able to conduct another test until the beginning of 2001.
July 14, 2001 The fourth intercept test (IFT-6) of the ground-based midcourse system successfully intercepts a mock warhead.
February 4, 2002 In its Pentagon budget request, the Bush administration earmarks $7.8 billion of the $367 billion defense budget for missile defense (the same amount approved for the previous year). Approximately 40 percent of the missile defense budget — $3.2 billion — is for the Bush administration’s GMD system.
Sources:
Missile Defense Agency
Council on Foreign Relations
Center for Defense Information
Union of Concerned Scientists
