January 1, 1997
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen publicly released the recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on May 19. The QDR is a new congressionally-mandated process by which the Department of Defense sets the course of American defense policy—strategy, force posture, infrastructure, and the like—through the next four years, and beyond. (A summary of the QDR’s recommendations is contained in the appendix.)
From a traditional understanding of military purpose and function, the QDR is seriously flawed. It fails to make hard choices. It asks for too little money and tries to do too many things. To the extent that QDR does make choices, they point in the wrong direction.
Unless U.S. defense policy is reoriented properly, we risk surrendering the high ground achieved by our victory in the Cold War, and by our military superiority as demonstrated in the Gulf War.
In fairness, one must acknowledge the difficulties that face the Department of Defense. Secretary Cohen is new to his job. Although he was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee for many years, he has no direct experience in defense management. When Cohen took office last January, the QDR process—involving hundreds of officials, backed by massive civilian and military bureaucracies—had been going on for months. Those officials and bureaucracies, doing what comes naturally, were well on the way to reaching a compromise that prevented any major interest (especially the military services) from being hurt too badly. Difficult choices were put off to the more distant future. Favorable assumptions about savings were made. At the same time, the Republican-led Congress reached a long-term budget agreement with the Clinton administration that fixed and limited defense spending through 2002. Under these circumstances, it would have been difficult for General George Marshall to turn things around, much less William Cohen.
Today, the U.S. military finds itself operating at an intense pace around the globe—-more so than at any peacetime in our history. But defense spending has been declining in real terms every year since 1985, and military planners assume that this decline will continue for the foreseeable future.
In that context, the bureaucratic course is to try to do everything, to keep one’s options open—to do no harm, especially since the U.S. military is still the dominant force in the world today. We must of course respect the judgement of those who may be called upon to put the lives and honor on the line, as may happen at any time, in places like Bosnia. The QDR will help them do this. But honesty requires us to recognize that this is not good enough. We must do more to guarantee our continued superiority.
The essence of strategy, and of statecraft, is to choose, and choose wisely—not to cover all bets. Resources—money, energy, time—are always limited. Demands on those resources are always unlimited. A successful strategy requires identifying the decisive and central factors. We cannot be strong everywhere and always. We must identify the places, times, and means that will determine the outcome of strategic, military campaigns.
During the Cold War, the United States identified and focused on what mattered. The adversary was the Soviet Union. The decisive theater was Europe. The critical military-technical instrument was long-range nuclear forces (and, in the last years, the means to defend against Soviet nuclear forces). To be sure, we worried about other enemies, did things in other parts of the world, and built and deployed other types of military forces. But rightly understood, these were subordinate to, and supportive of, U.S. efforts in the main area of strategic competition.
How does the QDR stack up according to this criteria? The report insists that “both U.S. national interests and limited resources argue for the selective use of U.S. forces.” (italics in original) But it is hard to see how this selectivity is to be applied. The QDR calls for a military strategy designed to:
“shape” the strategic environment through promoting regional stability, preventing or reducing conflicts and threats, and deterring aggression and coercion;
“respond” to the full spectrum of crises, deterring aggression and coercion in crises, conducing small-scale contingency operations, and fighting major theater wars; and
“prepare” for an uncertain future, which includes pursuing a focused modernization effort, exploiting the “Revolution in Military Affairs,” the “Revolution in Business Affairs,” and devising “insurance policies.”
The underlying thrust is clear: the U.S. military is to be all things to all people. To be sure, some attention should probably be given to all these areas. But which matter the most, and why? The QDR doesn’t say. It claims that “the path we have chosen strikes a balance between the present and the future.” Like Goldilocks, it tries to find a way that is “just right.” But not to choose is also a choice—for QDR contains assumptions that will skew U.S. military policy when real decisions have to be made.
The Clinton administration advocates a national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. According to the administration, the most important threats to the “international community” stem from “instability” created by transnational problems like poverty, disease, terrorism, global climate change, migration, and the difficulties of adjusting to a globalizing economy. The central role of the U.S. military in this world is to aid U.S. diplomacy and economic policy in ameliorating these threats to the well-being of humanity. Thus, the central “theaters” for the U.S. military are those places, like Bosnia and Rwanda, where transnational pressures have broken down central authority.
In the jargon of the QDR, these smaller scale “operations will still likely pose the most frequent challenge . . . Over time, substantial commitments to multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations will certainly stress U.S. forces in ways that must be carefully managed.” Translation: the U.S. military is to develop skills and equipment appropriate to dealing with these “instabilities”—showing the flag, assisting in peacekeeping, supporting humanitarian operations, combating terrorists, tracking down drug dealers, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting good “military-to military” ties.
To be sure, the QDR continues the current policy of being able to fight two nearly simultaneous wars with powers like Iraq and North Korea. It also speaks of hedging against the emergence of a “regional peer competitor”—-most likely, China or Russia—decades in the future. But these are clearly subordinated to the logic of engagement and enlargement, merely bigger manifestations of a changing global environment. The potential military threat posed by China and Russia, for example, is to be addressed primarily through engaging those powers in meeting common transnational threats (as we have done by inviting the Russians to send troops to Bosnia), and to encouraging them to participate in a peaceful, secure, and democratic international system.
One way to solve the QDR’s defect is to spend more money. There are good reasons to do this. The recent budget agreement treated national defense like just another line item—equivalent to tax credits for college education. It is not. National defense is one of the few, clear, and essential tasks of limited government. Of course, the military exists to protect us, not the other way around. But geopolitical and strategic necessity cannot be subordinated to the constant fluctuations in the economy and in domestic priorities.
Even if we did spend more money on defense, the benefits would be undermined by QDR’s strategic assumptions. We would simply be adding marginal dollars to one of many competing bureaucratic interests and programs. Or money would flow to those areas that the Clinton administration favors; we would become better peacekeepers and promoters of military-to-military contacts.
Instead, we should begin with the principle that the purpose of the U.S. armed forces is to fight and win wars. Not to feed the starving. Not to interdict drug dealers. Not to separate and pacify hostile ethnic factions. Not to develop friendly ties with foreign militaries. Not to discourage nuclear proliferation. In particular circumstances, each of these things may be good to do; but they cannot be the focus of American defense strategy.
Second, the strategic problem to address is not some vague “instability” that threatens the “international community” or “human security,” but rather the specific military threats that foreign nations can pose to the United States, its citizens, and allies. This means being concerned first and foremost with the configuration and allegiance of the most powerful states in the international system.
Our armed forces should be designed to make us welcome allies and fearsome enemies. In the present circumstances, we will want to ensure the continued friendship of key nations in Western Europe (e.g., Germany, Britain, and France) and East Asia (Japan, South Korea). We will want to ensure that other powerful states, like Russia, China, and India, will want to avoid conflict with us; and that we have the means to deal with them if they choose otherwise. Whether, and how, we employ military force in “smaller-scale contingencies” or “major theater wars” should be decided primarily according to whether they help our serious friends and discourage our serious potential enemies.
Finally, we must begin to put energy and money into developing appropriate equipment, doctrine, and organizations. We must develop the sort of capabilities—like advanced ballistic missile defenses and innovative long-range precision weapons—that allows us to intervene decisively at times and places of our own choosing, on the soil of our enemies (while keeping safe our own, and our allies,’ soil).
The QDR gives short-shrift to many of these longer-term investments in order to deal with the demands of smaller scale contingencies and rogue states. It neglects the common sense adage that trying to do all things usually means failing at most.
—————————————————————————————— APPENDIX
Following is a summary of Secretary of Defense Cohen’s Message, which served as a preface and executive summary to the QDR.
The Army will retain 10 active, combat-ready divisions. It will also accelerate its Force XXI modernization plan, which will revolutionalize combat capability by enhancing battlefield awareness through modern information technology. A reduction of some 15,000 active duty personnel will be carried out by deactivation, consolidation, and realignment of headquarters and support facilities to improve overall support to the combat organizations.
The Army will also restructure its Reserve component. It will shed some combat structure that provided for strategic depth during the Cold War, but which is now excess. It will also accelerate conversion of some units from combat to combat support and combat service support roles, relieving an important warfighting shortfall and enhancing the ability to support state missions. These adjustments will result in a Reserve component end strength reduction of some 45,000 personnel.
The Navy will retain 12 carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious ready groups, but will reduce the number of surface combatants in the fleet from 128 to 116. The reduced size of the surface fleet will be offset by newer and more capable systems now coming on line. The Navy will reduce the number of attack submarines from 73 to 50, reflecting changes in requirements. It will reduce the number of F/A-18E/F aircraft to be procured from 1000 to 548; transition to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as soon as possible, with the goal of initial Navy production in fiscal year 2008; and retain the option to procure additional F/A-18 E/F up to a maximum of 785 if Joint Strike Fighter development requires more time. These fleet reductions, combined with streamlining of overseas infrastructure and the transfer of some combat logistics ships and functions to the Military Sealift Command, will allow the Navy to reduce active and Reserve end strength by 18,000 and 4,100 personnel respectively.
The Air Force will consolidate fighter and bomber units to streamline its command structure and shift one active component fighter wing to the Reserve component. It will pursue an aggressive outsourcing plan that accelerates competition of support functions. The Air Force will reduce its force structure for continental air defense and handle the U.S. air sovereignty missions with other forces. The fighter forces available for deployment to support the strategy will be 12 active and eight Reserve fighter wing equivalents. These initiatives will allow the Air Force to realize a reduction of approximately 27,000 active duty personnel. The Air Force will proceed with the F-22 aircraft program to replace the F-15 C/D air superiority capability and perform air-to-ground missions. Consistent with its greater capability, the total number to be procured will be reduced from 438 to 339.
The Marine Corps will take modest reductions in end strength through a restructuring of support responsibilities. The Corps will maintain a three Marine Expeditionary Force capability to support the strategy. MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft procurement will be accelerated to meet the urgent need to replace aging medium-lift capability, while the total number procured will be reduced to 360, consistent with the system’s superior capability.
The total active duty end strength will be reduced to 1,360,000 (down 36 percent from 1989), with 835,000 in the Reserve forces (down 29 percent from 1989). Civilian personnel will decline to 640,000 (down 42 percent from 1989).
We have decided to slow the Army’s Theater High Altitude Area Defense System because of serious technical problems. Shifting the deployment date from 2004 to 2006 improves the stability of the program, lowers risk, and allows us to explore using common components with the Navy Theater-Wide missile defense program. Other theater missile defense programs remain on track.
National Missile Defense (NMD) remains a high priority. The administration and Congress have agreed to keep this program on an accelerated research and development path aimed at creating the option to make a decision on deployment possible as early as fiscal year 2000, if the threat warrants. The goal of the program is to be able to deploy an initial capability within three years after the decision on deployment is made. The QDR analysis concluded that the fiscal year 2000 target could not be met within the current program budget. We are directing additional funds to NMD, but even with additional funds, NMD will remain a program of high schedule and technical risk.
The QDR highlighted the danger to our nation and forces of “asymmetric threats,” ranging from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to attacks via information warfare and terrorism. We will give increased focus and funding to countering such threats.
The QDR studied a number of options regarding strategic nuclear forces.
The Review concluded that the policy and strategy to maintain our nuclear forces are still correct and needed. In line with congressional instructions, we will maintain the START I force posture in the current budget while the Russian Duma considers ratification of START II. To continue this in fiscal year 1999 would require an additional $64 million. We remain committed to START II and to negotiating further reductions in a START III agreement after START II is ratified. Savings from deeper strategic nuclear force reductions would free resources for our National Missile Defense program.
Based on QDR analysis of our future needs versus our remaining infrastructure, the Department will request authority for two additional rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and for the restructuring of laboratories, research, development, and test facilities. We will look for additional opportunities to outsource many functions and work with Congress to radically reengineer and deregulate the Department’s business practices.
Finally, a series of Defense-wide program adjustments will free up funds for increased investment in key programs.
Modernization of our forces depends upon a strong backbone of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The important and central role of these systems, and the large resources that must be devoted to them, inspired a hard and sweeping look at our entire effort devoted to C4ISR. The general focus and amount of resources devoted to this effort were determined to be appropriate. We made a similar study of our munitions programs and found that there is a high payoff for the large investment we are making in precision weapons and that the focus of the programs and the scale of effort are appropriate.
BRAC. The downsizing of our infrastructure has fallen behind the downsizing of our force structure, in spite of four BRAC rounds. Since the first base closure round, force structure has come down by 33 percent and will have declined by a total of 36 percent when we finish the reductions under the QDR. During the same period, we will have reduced domestic infrastructure by 21 percent as measured by the replacement value of physical facilities. We must shed more weight. though the savings from BRAC come slowly and require up-front costs, the savings to be achieved are significant. Last year, we began to receive annual savings beyond the annual costs for the first four BRAC rounds and by 2001, recurring savings will exceed $5 billion every year. The Review found that we have enough excess infrastructure to require the two additional rounds of BRAC for which we will seek authority. Included in the reduction of infrastructure must also be our research and development and test facilities, laboratories, and ranges.
REVOLUTION IN BUSINESS AFFAIRS. DoD needs to take advantage of business process improvements being pioneered in the private sector. Over the past decade, the American commercial sector has reorganized, restructured, and adopted revolutionary new business and management practices in order to ensure its competitive edge in the rapidly changing global marketplace. It has worked. Now the Department must adopt and adapt the lessons of the private sector if our armed forces are to maintain their competitive edge in the rapidly changing global security arena.
DoD is examining the best opportunities to outsource and privatize non-core activities, but many of those opportunities are restrained by regulations and practices built up during the Cold War. We need to deregulate defense just as we have deregulated many other American industries so we can reap the cost and creativity benefits of wide-open private competition. A guiding principle of the American government is that the government should not perform private sector-type functions, and this should also be true of the defense sector unless a compelling military need is demonstrated. Cohen has established a Defense Reform Task Force to review the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, DoD field activities, and the military departments and to look for ways we can consolidate functions, eliminate duplication of effort, and improve efficiency.
* “Who is to guard the guardians themselves?” —Juvenal, Satires
