Iraq's ballistic missile program began in the early 1970s with the purchase of a considerable number of Scud missiles from the Soviet Union. Throughout the following decade, Iraq began to develop longer-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq's long-range missile development program accelerated, in hopes of deterring the United States from protecting its allies in the Middle East. All Iraqi missile projects ended following the 2003 Iraq War. Nevertheless, Iraq remains a case study of the dangers of ballistic missile proliferation, especially to rogue nations.
Early Scud-Enhancement Projects
Beginning in the early 1970s, Iraq purchased a considerable number of short-range Scud missiles from the Soviet Union.[1] Iraq ultimately acquired 819 Scud-Bs and ground support equipment. In addition, it sought to acquire an effective long-range delivery capability, and set about purchasing the Soviet missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis for nearly all of its future development programs.[2]
During the 1980s, Iraq began to modify its Soviet-made Scud missiles in order to double their range. From these efforts came a new tactical ballistic missile, known as the Al-Hussein, which had a range of 650 km.[3] In August 1987, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq had successfully tested the Al-Hussein. During the final stage of the Iran-Iraq War, known as the "War of the Cities," Iraq fired 189 Al-Husseins at Tehran, Isfahan, and Qom, causing 8,000 casualties, some 2,000 of which were fatalities. The Al-Husseins were outfitted with both conventional high explosive and chemical warheads.[4] Iraq's second Scud-derived tactical ballistic missile was known as the Al-Abbas. First flight tested in April 1988, the missile had a range of 900 km, due to the reduced weight of its warhead and increased fuel capacity. However, sources indicate that the Al-Abbas development program was terminated around 1990, as evidenced by the fact that Iraq did not fire any Al-Abbas missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.[5]
Late-1980s Multi-Stage Development Program
In addition to its Scud enhancement projects, Saddam Hussein's ballistic missile program began to develop multi-stage designs during the late 1980s. In December 1989, Iraq launched the Al-Aabed, a 25-meter-long rocket that it claimed was the first stage of a multi-stage Space Launch Vehicle. It used five clustered Al-Hussein motors and was able to reach an altitude of 12 km during the test. A video of the launch released by the Iraqis showed a three-stage system. Although the second and third stages of the system were later revealed to have been dummies, it is believed that the second stage was intended to be a further Al-Hussein motor with the third stage derived from a Soviet-supplied S-75 surface-to-air missile. The Al-Aabed would have been able to deliver a chemical or small nuclear warhead over a range of at least 2,500 km. Reports indicate that the program was terminated following the Persian Gulf War.[6]
A few days after the December 1989 Al-Aabed test, Iraq announced that it had developed a second long-range system, known as the Tammouz-1. Like the Al-Aabed, the Tammouz-1 used modified Scud technology for its first stage and was intended to use a modified S-75 SAM sustainer as a second stage. Despite Iraq's claims to the contrary, the Tammouz-1 was never tested and remained in the development stage when the 1991 war broke out.[7]
Iraq also played a role in the Condor-2 program initiated by Argentina in 1982. A two stage, solid-fuelled missile intended to carry a 450 kg payload (possibly a nuclear warhead) at least 900 km, the Condor-2 project attracted co-funding from Egypt in 1984 and Iraq in 1985. In April 1990, under pressure from the United States, the Argentinean government announced that the project had been shelved due to rising costs. Egypt and Iraq were reported to have ceased their involvement at around the same time. However, it has emerged that Iraq continued its development of the missile, known as the Badr-2000, until 1990, apparently with the assistance of Pakistani technicians. In 1995, reports appeared suggesting that Iraqi technicians were working in Libya to revive the program or to integrate it with Libya's Al-Fatah program.[8]
1991 Persian Gulf War
By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify Russian-made delivery systems to increase their range and thus develop WMD dissemination options. In fact, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, it was an Al-Hussein missile strike against a U.S. military facility in Saudi Arabia that caused the greatest number of U.S. casualties in any single incident.[9] Analysis of the Al-Husseins fired during the war revealed that Iraq had achieved a range of 650 km by reducing the warhead to around 500 kg to allow an increase in fuel capacity. However, the missile's accuracy was poor, with reports putting its CEP at between 1 and 3.2 km. Thus, the direct hit in Saudi Arabia was most likely a fluke.[10]
Operation Desert Storm effectively brought many of Iraq's ballistic missile development programs to a halt. Much of Iraq's long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was eliminated. Under the terms of the 1991 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq had a mandate to destroy or make harmless "all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km, and related major parts, and repair and production facilities."[11] However, Iraq kept some items hidden in order to allow for a future reconstitution of its missile arsenal.[12] Thus, Iraq's indigenous missile development program remained active even during this period of international attention.
Saddam Hussein also never abandoned his intentions to resume Iraq's chemical weapons program when conditions were judged favorable. He and other Iraqis regarded chemical weapons as a proven weapon against an enemy that possessed superior numerical strength, as in the case of the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s.[13] In addition, Hussein regarded biological weapons as an integral part of his WMD arsenal, and would have used them if the need arose. According to the CIA's 2004 Duelfer Report, "Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his disposal were to be used." The ISG judged Iraq's actions between 1991 and 1996 as demonstrating that it intended to preserve its biological weapons capability.[14]
What is now widely accepted, however, is that Saddam Hussein ended his nuclear program in 1991. Following the 2003 Iraq War, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program. In the Duelfer Report, the CIA noted that Saddam Hussein had clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear progress and talent that had been developed up to the 1991 war, yet the program ended and the intellectual capital decayed in the following years. The CIA, however, acknowledged that Hussein expressed his intent to restart Iraq's nuclear program once U.N. sanctions ended.[15] However, there is no evidence of the existence of a nuclear weapons program leading up to the 2003 Iraq War.
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Development
What is lacking from most current debates over Iraqi WMDs, however, is the undisputed fact that Iraq maintained an aggressive long-range ballistic missile development program throughout the 1990s. In the Duelfer Report, the CIA states unequivocally that Saddam Hussein intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems for WMDs and that Iraq was developing both liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles during this period.[16] In fact, the pace of Iraq's missile development programs actually accelerated through the 1990s, and the regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have violated UNSCR 687.[17]
According to the CIA report, Iraq built a new and larger liquid-rocket engine capable, with some modification, of supporting engines or engine clusters larger than the single S-75 SAM engine used in the Al-Samud 2. Iraq also built or refurbished solid-propellant facilities and equipment, including a large propellant mixer, an aging oven, and a casting pit that could support large diameter motors. Iraq's investments in new propellants and manufacturing technologies demonstrated its desire for more capable or effective delivery systems. All in all, it was a time of learning and experiments that demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq's scientists and technicians and confirmed the Iraqi regime's goal of an effective long-range WBM delivery device. In the final assessment, the ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km, as well as for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile.[18]
Beyond the mere existence of Iraq's long-range missile project is the fact that Iraq received considerable assistance from foreign states, namely Russia and North Korea. According to the Duelfer Report, "technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assisted development of the Al Samud II during its rapid evolution. ISG also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems." In fact, during this period Iraq imported at least 380 S-75 liquid-propellant engines, which could have supported its long-range missiles, as well as missile guidance and control systems from possibly Russia or Belarus.[19] Thus, Iraq appears to have been well-connected to the vast ballistic missile proliferation network that flourished during the 1990s.
[1] Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Iraq Overview," available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_iraq_1.html, accessed on 1 May 2005.
[2] Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, "Delivery Systems," (30 September 2004), 1, 3; John Chipman, "Iraq WMD Dossier Statement," The International Institute for Strategic Studies (9 September 2002), available at: http://www.iiss.org/news-more.php?itemID=88, accessed on 1 May 2005.
[3] Chipman, "Iraq WMD Dossier Statement."
[4] Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 42 (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, January 2005), 104-105.
[5] Lennox (2005), 597.
[6] Lennox (2005), 598.
[7] Lennox (2005), 598.
[8] Lennox, ed., Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 41 (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, July 2004), 5.]
[9] John Chipman, "Iraq WMD Dossier Statement."
[10] Lennox (2005), 104-105.
[11] United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991.
[12] CIA, "Delivery Systems, 1.
[13] CIA, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program," 1-3.
[14] CIA, "Biological Warfare," 1-3.
[15] CIA, "Nuclear," 1.
[16] CIA, "Delivery Systems," 5.
[17] CIA, "Delivery Systems," 72.
[18] CIA, "Delivery Systems," 2.
[19] CIA, "Delivery Systems," 2.
